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I. INTRODUCTION 
Market power is often said to be central to antitrust analysis.' 
Conceptually, this makes sense, of course. Without market power, a 
seller cannot impose anticompetitive terms and therefore need not be 
kept in check by the antitrust laws. 2 As a practical matter, though, the 
focus on market power is not so obviously appropriate. The market 
power inquiry is generally acknowledged to be one of the most difficult 
and inconclusive in antitrust law,' and market definition, which is often a 
I. See, e.g., George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 
807 (1991) ("The concept of market power is at the core of antitrust."); William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 
937 (1981) ("Market power is a key concept in antitrust law."). This Article focuses 
particularly on section I of the Sherman Act cases brought under the rule of reason, 
where market power is particularly important. See Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. 
Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Substantial 
market power is an indispensable ingredient of every claim under the full [r]ule of 
[r]eason."); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 79 ( 1994) ("Today most courts require a showing of 
market power in cases alleging unlawful vertical restrictions or dealer terminations."). 
"The term 'market power' refers to the ability of a firm (or a group of firms, acting 
jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly 
that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded." Landes & Posner, supra, 
at 937. 
2. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tux. L. REv. I, 20 
(1984) ("Firms that lack power cannot injure competition no matter how hard they try."); 
Hay, supra note I, at 808: 
If we accept the notion that the point of antitrust is promoting consumer 
welfare, then it is clear why the concept of market power plays such a 
prominent role in antitrust analysis. If the structure of the market is such that 
there is little potential for consumers to be harmed, we need not be especially 
concerned with how firms behave because the presence of effective 
competition will provide a powerful antidote to any effort to exploit 
consumers. 
Id.; see Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distribution: Per se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 16 (1981) [hereinafter Posner, Next 
Step] ("[I]f a firm lacks market power, it cannot affect the price of its product; that price 
is determined by the market."). 
3. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (I Ith Cir. 
I 983) ("[M]arket power is not well suited to presentation in an adversary proceeding."); 
Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) 
("Since market power can rarely be measured directly by the methods of litigation, it is 
normally inferred from possession of a substantial percentage of the sales in a market 
carefully defined in terms of both product and geography."); see also Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305, 312 (1987) 
("Just as courts may err in thinking that a practice is harmful, so they may err in thinking 
that a firm does not have market power."). 
2 
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prerequisite to the evaluation of market power, is similarly problematic.' 
Therefore, although it is clear why market power plays a central role in 
antitrust analysis, it is unclear why it should occupy a role so central-
indeed, so often dispositive'-in antitrust litigation. 
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act,' on which this Article will focus, 
a central position for market power has been mandated neither by statute 
nor by the Supreme Court. Section 1 refers only to "contract[s] ... in 
restraint of trade,"' language that suggests no market power requirement. 
Nor has the Supreme Court imposed any general market power 
requirement under section 1. To be sure, the Court has imposed market 
power requirements in certain categories of section 1 cases, but they are 
only those cases in which the plaintiff proceeds under a per se theory.' 
Indeed, the Court has on several occasions specifically rejected a market 
power requirement in section 1 rule of reason cases.' 
4. Robert Pitofsky has emphasized this point: 
Unfortunately. no aspect of antitrust enforcement has been handled nearly 
as badly as market definition. This failure has resulted in part because of 
persistent and unreconciled conflicts of approach in important judicial 
opinions. It also reflects the fact that the critical issues in relevant market 
definition-(!) what products are sufficiently close substitutes to compete 
effectively in each other's market (definition of "relevant product market"); (2) 
what firms are sufficiently proximate to others in spatial terms to compete 
effectively (definition of "relevant geographic market"); and (3) what 
substitute sources of supply can be diverted promptly and economically to 
offer effective competition ("supply substitutability")-are all matters of 
degree that are extremely difficult to measure. 
Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1990) (footnote omitted). As the cases cited supra at note 
3 point out, market share is frequently used as a proxy for market power, but market 
share cannot be determined without first defining the market. 
5. See Hay, supra note I, at 807 ("Operationally, assessing whether a firm or 
firms have market power or any reasonable prospect for achieving it is often the first 
(and sometimes, the only) step in performing an antitrust analysis."). 
6. For discussions of the role of market power under section 2 of the Sherman 
Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act, see infra Part H.B. 
7. 15 U.S.C. § I (1994). Section I of the Sherman Act condemns "[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations .... " Id. 
8. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 
(1992) (condemning tying arrangements); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. 
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985) (excluding competitor from 
joint venture); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-16 (1984) 
(condemning tying arrangement); see also Hay, supra note I, at 811-12 (discussing 
requirements of market power in Jefferson Parish and Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 
and noting that the Supreme Court did not require market power in rule of reason cases). 
9. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986); NCAA v. 
3 
The apparent ascendancy of market power under section 1 is thus a 
phenomenon of the lower courts. More specifically, it is a rhetorical 
triumph of Richard Posner and to a lesser extent Frank Easterbrook, 
initially in their roles as professors at the University of Chicago Law 
School and later as judges on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.10 
The history of this triumph is somewhat disconcerting, in that some of 
the leading Seventh Circuit cases supported their adoption of a market 
power requirement by pointing to cases in other circuits that they said 
had already adopted such a requirement, when those earlier cases had 
not in fact done so." In this way, the current role of market power has 
been built on a shaky foundation. 
That role, moreover, is not nearly as significant as it often is said to 
be. Despite occasional claims that most circuits have adopted a market 
power requirement in rule of reason cases,12 only three-the Seventh, 
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-IO (1984). Both Indiana Federation of Dentists and 
NCM were horizontal cases, but the Court has seemed equally reluctant to adopt a 
market power requirement in vertical cases. In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), Justice White in concurrence argued strongly for the use of 
such a requirement to distinguish vertical restraints that are subject to a per se rule from 
those subject to the rule of reason. See id. at 70 (White, J., concurring). However, the 
Court declined to adopt a market power test. The Court also could have adopted a 
market power test in its discussions of rule of reason claims in tying cases, but it has 
declined to do so. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
10. For examples of the academic advocacy of Posner and Easterbrook, see supra 
note 2. As evidence of their judicial role, note that the Seventh Circuit provides eight of 
the twenty-two cases cited by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law's Antitrust Law 
Developments for the claim that "(c]ourts have generally held that proof of a defendant's 
market power is an absolute prerequisite for a plaintiff seeking to use market analysis to 
satisfy its burden of proving likely anticompetitive effect." 1 ABA SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 60-61 n.313 (4th ed. 1997) 
[hereinafter ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW]. None of the twenty-two cases is from 
the Supreme Court. See id. 
11. See infra Part IILC 
12. See Appeal of Toys "R" Us, Inc. to the FTC (Public Record Version) at 49, In 
re Toys "R" Us, Inc., Docket No. 9278 (Nov. 20, 1997) ("In vertical nonprice cases, 
most courts of appeals have required a plaintiff to make a threshold showing that the 
defendant imposing the restrictions had market power in order to establish the required 
adverse effect on competition."); The Supreme Court, 1997 Term: Leading Cases, 112 
HARV. L. REv. 122, 299 n.43 (1998) ("Indeed, in many circuits a showing of market 
power or market share is a threshold requirement for rule of reason cases."); The 
Supreme Court, 1983 Term: Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 260 (1984) ("The rule 
of reason generally includes an analysis of both market power and procompetitive 
justifications .... A showing of market power has normally been required because a 
group of competitors without such power cannot impose a restraint that will harm 
consumers.") (footnote omitted); see also Michael L. Denger & M. Sean Royall, Vertical 
Price, Customer and Territorial Limitations, in 39TIJ ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW 
INSTITUTE 723, 797 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1049, 
1998): 
4 
To establish that the supplier imposing the restrictions has the market power to 
bring about the required adverse effect on competition, courts have 
increasingly required plaintiffs to make a threshold showing that the supplier's 
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Fourth, and Eighth-ever did so unequivocally, and the Eighth has since 
retreated. The other circuits that are said to have adopted a market 
power requirement have actually drawn up short of that position in 
various ways: by merely saying that adoption of a market power 
requirement would be a good idea, without clearly adopting one;" by 
stating they were adopting such a requirement, but only in cases that did 
not turn on the issue;" or, most commonly, by emphasizing that in the 
absence of market power anticompetitive effect is impossible, but not 
explicitly requiring the plaintiff to prove power." 
Of course, one could read any of these positions loosely as an 
adoption of market power. To do so, however, would be to overlook the 
fact that these courts could easily have adopted a market power 
requirement clearly and explicitly. Instead, they have carefully avoided 
doing so. The frequency with which courts have almost said that proof 
of market power is required cannot be merely accidental; some other 
factor must be at work. Perhaps courts find a failure to show market 
power a convenient basis on which to dispose of weak cases. Or perhaps 
the courts either would like to require market power or would like to 
defer to other courts that do so, but are uncomfortable with actually 
imposing such a requirement, particularly in the absence of Supreme 
Court authority. 
Part II of this Article describes the limited place of market power in 
antitrust law as the Supreme Court has interpreted it. Part III describes 
how market power has acquired a more expansive role in the lower 
courts. The point of the section is not to diminish the legitimate role that 
market power plays in antitrust law, but to suggest that the greater role it 
now plays, or is said to play, is neither inevitable nor especially well 
supported. Part IV surveys the use of a market power requirement in the 
circuits, demonstrating that the requirement was and is more limited than 
has often been said. Part V offers some comments on the theoretical 
justifications that have been offered for a market power requirement, and 
the Article concludes with some final observations. 
Id. 
market share (used as a proxy for market power) is sufficiently high that the 
overall market could be impacted. 
13. See infra Part IV.C. (regarding the D.C. Circuit). 
14. See infra Part IV.C. (regarding the Eleventh Circuit). 
15. See infra Part IV.C. (regarding the Fifth Circuit). 
5 
IL THE MARKET POWER CONCEPT IN THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Market Power in Section I of the Sherman Act Cases 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act contains no reference at all to market 
power, or even, more generally, to market structure; its prohibition of 
any "contract, combination ... , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" is 
focused entirely on conduct.16 Early on, though, the Supreme Court 
determined that the language of section I is insufficient as a guide to its 
enforcement. In Standard Oil Company v. United States," the Court 
established reasonableness as the basic section 1 test," and in Board of 
Trade v. United States 19 it set out a number of factors to be considered in 
applying this "rule of reason."'° Among those factors then, and in 
subsequent guides to the rule of reason," were several related to market 
power.22 
The Court, however, has never required that a plaintiff prove the 
defendant's market power in a rule of reason case; market power has 
been only one factor among many to be considered. Under section 1, the 
Court has required proof of power only in two categories of per se cases, 
those involving tying arrangements" and those involving exclusions of 
competitors from joint ventures. 24 In per se cases, where actual 
16. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1994). 
17. 221 U.S. I (1911). 
18. See id. at 63-64. 
19. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
20. The inquiry is all-encompassing: 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely 
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as 
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the 
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the 
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the 
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the 
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular 
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 
Id. at 238. 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948) ("In 
determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint, we ... look ... to the percentage of 
business controlled, the strength of the remaining competition, whether the action 
springs from business requirements 01 purpose to monopolize, the probable development 
of the industry, consumer demands, and other characteristics of the market."). 
22. In the statement quoted in the preceding footnote, the reference to "the 
percentage of business controlled," and perhaps also that to "the strength of the 
remaining competition," point to factors that are usually considered important in 
evaluating market power. 
23. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984) 
(stating that the Court has condemned tying arrangements per se "when the seller has 
some special ability-usually called 'market power' -to force a purchaser to do 
something that he would not do in a competitive market"). 
24. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 
6 
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anticompetitive effects need not be shown, a requirement of proof of 
power makes sense. The proof of power, together with proof of a 
particular sort of restraint, substitutes for the proof of anticompetitive 
effect that is required under the rule of reason. 
Furthermore, in the two per se contexts in which the Court has 
required proof of market power, the nature of the power the Court 
required was tailored to the nature of the case.25 The specificity of the 
Court's use of market power is emphasized in Jefferson Parish Hospital 
District No. 2 v. Hyde. 26 After the Court required market power for the 
application of the per se rule, its discussion of the defendant's liability 
under the rule of reason did not mention market power in general or the 
defendant's market share in particular, noting only that the plaintiff had 
failed to meet its burden of "showing . . . actual adverse effect on 
competition. "21 This all suggests that to the extent the Court sees a role 
for market power under section 1, that role is to be tailored to particular 
sorts of cases, and perhaps only to per se cases, not applied as an 
indiscriminate screen to all section 1 cases.28 
472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985) (considering whether the per se rule or the rule of reason was 
the appropriate analysis for the expulsion of a member of a joint venture cooperative, 
and concluding that the per se rule was inappropriate "[u]nless the cooperative possesses 
market power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition"). 
25. In Jefferson Parish, the Coun offered this gloss on tying market power: "This 
type of market power has sometimes been referred to as 'leverage.' ... '"Leverage" is 
loosely defined here as a supplier's power to induce his customer for one product to buy 
a second product from him that would not otherwise be purchased solely on the merit of 
the second product."' Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14 n.20 (quoting 5 PHILLIP AREEDA 
& DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND 
THEIRAPPLICATION'f 1134a, at 202 (1980)). 
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the per se test established by the Coun turned on 
whether the "the cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access to an element 
essential to effective competition." Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 296. 
As Professor Hay has said, the latter part of this test-"'unique access to a business 
element necessary to effective competition"'-seems to be a description of a particular 
kind of market power. Hay, supra note I, at 812 (quoting Northwest Wholesale 
Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298). 
26. 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
27. Id. at 31. The Coun pointed out that the relevant market could have involved 
either the "market in which hospitals compete in offering services to patients"-that is, 
the market relevant to its per se discussion-or the market for "competition among 
anesthesiologists for exclusive contracts" with hospitals. Id. at 29. 
28. Another indication that the Coun favors specific conceptions of market power 
in its per se rules can be found in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
36 (I 977). In Sylvania, the Coun had an opponunity to rely on market power in 
deciding when the per se rule would apply to nonprice venical restraints. The case 
involved a location restriction imposed on its dealers by Sylvania, a television 
7 
The Court's rule of reason cases also indicate that its confinement of 
the market power requirement to per se cases is no accident. In two 
cases in which the Court considered arguments that market power should 
be required under the rule of reason, it rejected those arguments.29 In the 
most recent of the cases, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,"' the 
defendant argued that the FfC had failed to show market power." The 
Court responded that a showing of market power was not necessary 
when anticompetitive effects had been shown. The Court explained: 
Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to 
determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects 
on competition, "proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of 
output," can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a 
"surrogate for detrimental effects."32 
Both Indiana Federation of Dentists and NCM v. Board of Regents," 
the other case in which the Court rejected a market power requirement, 
were horizontal cases. The market power requirement is equally 
important in vertical cases, however, so one might question whether the 
Court's statements in its horizontal cases are more broadly relevant. 
That is especially so in that vertical cases are generally thought to 
manufacturer with a single-digit market share, and Justice White, relying primarily on 
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I (1958), said that "[i]n other 
areas of antitrust law, this Court has not hesitated to base its rules of per se illegality in 
part on the defendant's market power." Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 65 (White, J., concurring). 
The Court, however, approached the case by asking, following its prescription from 
Northern Pacific for application of the per se rule, whether the challenged restraint was 
one that "because of [its] pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming 
virtue [should be] conclusively presumed to be unreasonable." Id. at 50 (quoting 
Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 5). It answered that question not by reference to the 
importance of market power, or by reference to Sylvania's very small market share, but 
by reference to the variety of circumstances in which vertical restraints can be 
procompetitive. See id. at 55. 
29. Those who argue that the Court would support such a requirement often cite an 
observation that the Court made in Sylvania: "[W]hen interbrand competition exists, as it 
does among television manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation 
of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different 
brand of the same product." Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19. There are three reasons, 
however, why reading this statement as an endorsement of a market power requirement 
would be incorrect. First, the Court made it only in a footnote defining interbrand 
competition. Second, Sylvania did not involve an application of the rule of reason, but a 
determination of whether the rule of reason or per se rule was the proper standard. 
Third, and most important, the crucial question is not whether market power is important 
in theory-it clearly is, as the Court's observation acknowledges-but whether proof of 
it should be required in litigation-a question on which the Court's observation sheds no 
light. 
30. 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
31. See id. at 460. 
32. Id. at460-61 (quoting 7 PHILLIPE. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 'f 1511, at 429 (] 986)). 
33. 468 U.S. 5 (1984). 
8 
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present less of a competitive danger than horizontal ones," so that using 
market power to screen out vertical cases could be viewed as desirable. 
But there is another way to look at the matter: the form of market power 
present in horizontal cases-aggregation of market share-is much 
easier to measure in litigation than market power in vertical cases, which 
usually derives from product differentiation." Therefore, as a matter of 
litigation accuracy and efficiency, it might be less sensible to use a 
market power requirement in vertical cases. That possibility is in fact 
consistent with the Supreme Court's limited uses of market power in per 
se cases, where the forms of power on which the Court has relied have 
been horizontal. 36 
The Supreme Court's most recent opportunity to clarify the position of 
market power came last term, in California Dental Ass'n v. FTC.31 In 
that case, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's use of a "quick look" to 
condemn certain advertising restrictions imposed by the California 
Dental Association." The Court indicated that because the restrictions 
were not ones whose "great likelihood of anticompetitive effects [could] 
easily be ascertained," 39 a fuller rule of reason analysis was necessary. 
The Court, however, did not describe such an analysis in detail, or make 
market power a required part of it, stating only that the degree of market 
analysis required will differ with the nature of the restraint. 40 
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, in which three other justices 
joined, was more explicit on the issue of market power. Justice Breyer 
suggested that "a traditional application of the rule of reason" comprised 
the following questions: "(1) What is the specific restraint at issue? (2) 
34. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-55 (1977); 
The Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 308 (1988) 
("All vertical agreements, even beneficial ones, have horizontal effects, but, because the 
anticompetitive danger is greater when direct competitors agree than when 
noncompetitors agree, the Court [in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988)] properly advised lower courts to treat horizontal agreements 
more suspiciously than vertical agreements.") (footnote omitted). 
35. See Peter M. Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages" Explanation for 
Intrabrand Restraints: An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 DUKE L.J. 417, 441-43 (1981) 
(describing how the relevant source of market power in vertical restraints is product 
differentiation). 
36. That is true not only in the joint venture context of Northwest Wholesale 
Stationers, but also in the tying context, where the sort of coercive power on which the 
Court has focused is generally a function of market share, not of product differentiation. 
37. 119 s. Ct. 1604 (1999). 
38. See id. at 1618. 
39. Id. at 1613. 
40. See id. at 1617. 
9 
What are its likely anticompetitive effects? (3) Are there offsetting 
procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the parties have sufficient market 
power to make a difference?'"" The location of the market power 
inquiry, last in this series of questions, suggests that Justice Breyer does 
not see it as a threshold issue. More support for that reading is found in 
his statement that he only "assume[d]" that the FrC was required under 
the rule of reason to prove market power." Even more interesting is that 
Justice Breyer does not adopt the Chicago School view that without 
market power any restraint must be procompetitive, but instead appears 
to assume that the restraint is anticompetitive and looks to market power 
only to determine whether it is of a magnitude sufficient to implicate the 
antitrust laws.43 
B. The Place of Market Power in the Court's Antitrust Jurisprudence 
The Court's use of market power in section 1 cases is consistent with 
its role in the Court's other antitrust cases. In section 2 monopolization 
cases, of course, the Court has required a showing of power. In United 
States v. Grinnell Corp.,44 it set out the basic test under section 2,45 which 
the Court said "has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power 
in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.'"'6 But the Court's reasons for requiring power under section 2 
do not justify a similar requirement under section 1.47 
41. Id. at 1618 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
42. Id. at 1621 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I shall 
assume that the Commission must prove one additional circumstance, namely, that the 
Association's restraints would likely have made a real difference in the marketplace.") 
( citing AREEDA, supra note 32, at 376-77). 
43. See id. 
44. 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
45. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes illegal the acts of "[e]very person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). 
46. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71. 
47. Indeed, one recent case has held the converse, that the Court's failure to 
require power under section I means that it also should not be required under section 2. 
The Sixth Circuit in Re/Max International, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995 (6th 
Cir. 1999),petitionforcert.filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3138 (Aug. 17, 1999) (No. 99-294), said 
that "[t]he Supreme Court has noted on at least two occasions that direct evidence of 
monopoly power will support an antitrust claim." Id. at 1019. The two cases the court 
cited as standing for the proposition that proof of effects is sufficient were Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), and Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, both of which the court acknowledged supported the proposition 
only in the section I context, but the court said that it saw "no reason to believe that 
10 
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The Court's section 2 opinions do not indicate that it believes that 
possession of market power is necessary for an act to be anticompetitive. 
The offense of monopolization can be proven for a trade practice 
imposed by a seller that does not initially possess market power. This is 
because the willful acquisition of monopoly power is a section 2 
violation. Mergers to monopoly are the obvious example," but there are 
other acquisitions of monopoly power that resemble those section 1 
violations that are usually evaluated under the rule of reason. For 
example, a seller that enters into an exclusive arrangement with a 
supplier can foreclose its competitors from access to the supplier and 
thus gain monopoly power (if access to the supplier is important)." 
Additionally, misleading customers in certain ways has been found to 
constitute monopolization.50 In neither of these circumstances does the 
seller need monopoly power, or market power, to accomplish its 
anticompetitive goal.'1 
monopoly power in the [section] I context is any different from the [section] 2 monopoly 
power the plaintiffs allege here." Id. at 1019. 
48. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911); United States v. 
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
49. This is the conduct alleged in the recent FfC complaint against Mylan 
Laboratories, Inc.: 
Mylan acted with a specific intent to monopolize, and to destroy competition 
in, the generic lorazepam tablets market. Mylan devised and implemented a 
calculated campaign to raise the price and profitability of lorazepam by 
Jocking up the supply of lorazepam API, the most essential ingredient for 
making generic lorazepam tablets. 
Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief 'I 63, FfC v. Mylan 
Laboratories, Inc., Case No. 1:98CV03114 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1999), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9902/mylanamencmp.htm>. It was also one of the forms 
of conduct challenged in the Alcoa case. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 
148 F.2d 416,422 (2d Cir. 1945); see also 3A PHILLIPE. AREEDA & DoNALD F. TURNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 'f 
768a, at 147 (1996) ("It is presumptively exclusionary for a monopolist to extract a 
supplier's promise that ... [it] will not supply any of the monopolist's rivals-as, for 
example, Alcoa did in its early years with its suppliers of electric power."). 
50. See Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources Inc., 829 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
51. In the exclusive dealing example, the seller need only be willing to share the 
resulting monopoly profits with its exclusive supplier. See Director of Investigation & 
Research v. D&B Cos. of Canada Ltd., 64 C.P.R. 3d 216, 255 (1995) (observing, where 
defendant had entered into exclusive arrangements to purchase scanner data from 
retailers, that "the sole relevance of the market position of the retailers lies in their ability 
to command a share of any monopoly returns that [the defendant] may be able to obtain" 
and that "[t]he position of the retailers does not detract from [the defendant's] ability to 
exercise any market power it may hold .... "). Where the seller misleads customers, 
even that is not necessary, because the deception, by increasing demand for the seller's 
11 
One might object to this analysis on the ground that the Supreme 
Court requires power to establish an attempt to monopolize, which might 
be interpreted to suggest that it believes power is necessary to acquire a 
monopoly. Indeed, in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,52 where the 
Court required a dangerous probability of success in attempt cases, the 
Court's primary concern appeared to be the difficulty of distinguishing 
procompetitive from anticompetitive conduct," which might suggest that 
the Court viewed market power as necessary for anticompetitive effect. 
The Court did not, however, rely on a claim that anticompetitive conduct 
is impossible without economic power." Instead, its concern was with 
the particular problem of identifying anticompetitive unilateral activity, 
and it adopted a market power requirement only in that particular 
context. The Court explicitly distinguished unilateral action from 
"concerted activity covered by [section] 1, which 'inherently is fraught 
with anticompetitive risk,"'55 suggesting that no similar market power 
requirement would be necessary in the section 1 context. 
Even in the Court's Clayton Act merger cases, where the structural 
focus would lead one to expect an emphasis on market power, the role of 
power is limited. In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,56 
which is still the Court's leading merger case, the Court said that the 
"ultimate question under [section 7 is] whether the effect of the merger 
'may be substantially to lessen competition' in the relevant market."" It 
then established a role for market power, in the form of market share 
measures, but not as a necessary element in proving the likelihood of a 
lessening of competition. Instead, as in the per se context under section 
I, the Court allowed proof of market power to substitute for proof of 
product, creates its own market power. See Mark R. Patterson, Coercion, Deception, 
and Other Demand-Increasing Practices in Antitrust Law, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. I, 16-20 
(1997). 
52. 506 U.S. 447 (1993). 
53. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 244-45. 
54. The Court did point out, though, that in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. 
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), it had stated that it was 
"necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the 
relevant market for the product involved" because '" [ w ]ithout a definition of that market 
there is no way to measure [the defendant's] ability to lessen or destroy competition."' 
Spectrum Spons, 506 U.S. at 456 (quoting Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177) (alteration 
in original). 
55. Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 459 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence 
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69 (1984)). 
56. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
57. Id. at 362 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312 n.18 
(1962)). Section 7 of the Clayton Act condemns acquisitions of stock or assets "where in 
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the 
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to 
tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). The significance of the Court's 
omission of the monopoly language is unclear. 
12 
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likely competitive effect: 
[W]e think that a merger which produces a finn controlling an undue percentage 
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the 
concentration of finns in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen 
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence 
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive 
effects." 
In sum, the Court's cases dealing with section 2 of the Sherman Act 
and section 7 of the Clayton Act echo two basic themes from its section 
1 cases. First, the role of market power is tailored to particular 
categories of cases; it is not applied indiscriminately as a determinant of 
anticompetitive effect. Thus, the forms of power that are at issue in 
tying cases and cases of exclusions from joint ventures are specific to the 
competitive problems presented in those cases. In addition, power, or a 
dangerous probability of monopolization, is used in attempted 
monopolization cases because of the particular problems in evaluating 
unilateral activity. Second, when the Court does establish a role for 
proof of market power, it is often used as an alternative to evaluating 
anticompetitive effect, rather than as an element in the proof of such 
effect. In none of the Court's cases, under any of the antitrust statutes, 
does it suggest that proof of market power is generally necessary to 
establish proof of anticompetitive effect. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MARKET POWER REQUIREMENT 
A. Early Commentary 
The first commentary advocating the use of market power in section I 
rule of reason cases appeared in 1977. In its monograph of that year on 
vertical restraints, the American Bar Association's Section on Antitrust 
Law said that "[t]o determine the significance of the effects of an 
intrabrand restraint on overall competition, the market power of the 
product on which the intrabrand restriction has been placed must be 
assessed."'9 Notably, this statement did not go so far as to require a 
58. Philadelphia Nat'/ Bank, 374 U.S. at 363. The Court observed that "[s]uch a 
test lightens the burden of proving illegality only with respect to mergers whose size 
makes them inherently suspect in light of Congress'[s] design in [section] 7 to prevent 
undue concentration." Id. 
59. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL 
RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 62 ( 1977). Richard Posner 
13 
showing of market power; it only said that power should be "assessed." 
To that extent, it was consistent with the expressed views of the 
Supreme Court, which had included market power, or factors related to 
it, among factors to be considered."' 
On the other hand, the ABA monograph said that market power "must 
be" assessed. In this, it went beyond the Supreme Court's statements, as 
evidenced by its failure to cite any Supreme Court cases in support of its 
assertion. Indeed, neither of the two lower-court cases that it cited 
supports the statement. One, United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,"' 
said only that the "portion of the market" is a factor in determining the 
competitive effect of a restraint;62 although one could interpret this 
statement to imply that all such factors must be examined, the case does 
not go that far explicitly. The second case, Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. 
United States,63 specifically stated that examination of market power can 
be forgone. 64 
The second, and more prominent, 1977 commentary on the market 
power issue was then-Professor Richard Posner's article, The Rule of 
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania 
Decision. In this article, Posner suggested an approach that "would 
automatically preclude liability unless the manufacturer had a very large 
market share or unless all or most of the manufacturers in the market 
imposed uniform restrictions on their dealers so that (in either case) the 
dealers had a monopoly position in a genuine economic market."65 Thus, 
Posner emphasized market share, but the share that he said is relevant 
was that occupied by the challenged restriction, not the defendant.66 
Later, he abandoned that approach and focused only on the share of the 
defendant.67 In any event, in the 1977 article, he identified no Supreme 
Court case in support of his view, citing only the circuit court opinion in 
characterizes this monograph as "an exhaustive analysis of the evolution of restricted 
distribution law to the eve of Sylvania." Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the 
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. l, 3 n.10 
(1977) [hereinafter Posner, Economic Approach]. 
60. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22. 
61. 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
62. Id. at 178. 
63. 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
64. See id. at 1381. 
65. Posner, Economic Approach, supra note 59, at 17. 
66. This approach is similar to those of the National Association of Attorneys 
General in its Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 996 
(Dec. 5, 1985), and of the European Commission in its recent revision of its approach to 
vertical restraints, Communication from the Commission on the Application of the 
Community Competition Rules to Vertical Restraints (Follow-Up to the Green Paper on 
Vertical Restraints), 1998 O.J. (C 365) 3. 
67. See infra text accompanying note 111. 
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United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,68 a horizontal price-fixing 
case.69 
B. Posner's 1981 Article and the Pre-Valley Liquors Cases 
In 1981, one year before he wrote the Seventh Circuit's opinion in 
Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Ren.field Importers, Ltd.,70 which is discussed in 
the next section of this Article, Professor Posner published a second 
article addressing vertical restraints. 71 In the article, Posner said that 
"[s]ome courts have narrowed the defendant's risk by requiring that the 
plaintiff in a [r]ule of [r]eason case prove substantial market power in a 
relevant market."" He cited seven cases in the footnote to this 
statement." In fact, although two of these cases came close to doing so, 
none clearly established market power as a requirement. An 
appreciation of how far the cases were from adequately supporting 
Posner's statement requires that they be examined individually. 
Four of the cases not only did not themselves require a showing of 
market power, but made clear their views that proof of market power is 
not required. One of these, Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.," 
68. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), ajf'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)). 
69. See Posner, Economic Approach, supra note 59, al 17 n.50 ( citing Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 271). This citation may be reasonable in light of Posner's 
exclusive focus on the harm of cartelization. The ''vastly superior" approach, Posner 
opines, "is to focus on the single question whether the restriction is intended to cartelize 
distribution or, on the contrary, to promote the manufacturer's own interests." Id. at 17. 
70. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982), later proceeding, 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987). 
71. See Posner, Next Step, supra note 2, at 6. 
72. Id. at I 6. In contrast to Posner's earlier view that the relevant measure of 
market power was that possessed by all sellers imposing the same restriction, see 
supra text accompanying notes 65-69, the relevant power referred to by Posner in this 
article is that possessed by the defendant. See Posner, Next Step, supra note 2, at 16 ("In 
practice, this means that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has a large market 
share-how large is unclear."). 
73. See id. at 16 n.39. Most of the same cases are cited in the article on market 
power that Posner co-authored the same year with William Landes. See Landes & 
Posner, supra note 1, at 956 n.35 (citing Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 388-
89 (9th Cir. 1978); Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90-
91 (5th Cir. 1978); Oreck Cmp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 130 n.5 (2d Cir. 
1978); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 562 
(1st Cir. 1974)). In the Landes and Posner article, however, the authors also cited cases 
taking the contrary position. See id. at 956 n.35 (citing Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 
622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980); Harold Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Markets Inc., 
587 F.2d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
74. 575 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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made only a general comment to this effect," but the other three 
discussed the issue more specifically. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp." 
was most explicit." The court in Oreck noted that the plaintiff had not 
shown that the defendant's share of the market was sufficient to allow an 
anticompetitive interbrand effect,78 which might on a quick reading 
suggest that it found market power to be dispositive. But the court also 
said that the challenged action-a manufacturer's elimination of one 
dealer in favor of another-had not given the remaining dealer "a market 
position from which it could raise retail prices even in the face of 
interbrand competition."" That is, even with interbrand competition-a 
lack of interbrand market power-the court was willing to consider the 
possibility of presumably intrabrand anticompetitive effects.'° 
Somewhat similar was Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark 
Industries, Inc.," which also involved the substitution of one dealer for 
another. The court of appeals called "impeccably correct" the district 
court's conclusion that in showing only this sort of substitution, the 
plaintiff "had failed to produce facts which would demonstrate 
anticompetitive effect."" But the appeals court then went on to examine 
market power in order to distinguish the case from another in which "an 
anticompetitive effect was said to exist when the new distributor, if 
effective in driving out the old, would become a monopolist."" Thus, 
the court was apparently willing to consider the attainment of intrabrand 
market power as a violation in itself; whether the court would have been 
willing to find liability on that basis is not clear, but its mention of 
interbrand power in what seems to have been an afterthought is 
• 84 suggest! ve. 
75. "Increased concentration, as shown by a change in relative market shares, may 
be an indicator, or a change in prices, output or quality which evinces market power may 
be significant." Id. at 571 (emphasis added). This statement is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's characterization of market share as a factor to be considered, rather 
than a requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22. 
76. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978). 
77. Other commentators have noted this, which makes Posner's citation of the case 
peculiar. 
78. See Oreck, 579 F.2d at 130 n.5. 
79. Id. 
80. This interpretation of Oreck is supported by a later Second Circuit case, 
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980). In Eiberger, the 
defendant argued that the plaintiff was required to show anticompetitive effect on the 
interbrand market and that "an anticompetitive impact on intrabrand competition cannot 
alone support a finding that [section] 1 has been violated," but the court rejected that 
argument. Id. at 1081. 
81. 576 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978). 
82. Id. at 90. 
83. Id. (citing Cherokee Lab., Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Servs., Inc., 383 F.2d 97 (5th 
Cir. 1967)). 
84. At the end of the paragraph in which the court presents the analysis described 
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H & B Equipment Co. v. International Harvester Co." was also 
decided on the basis of the plaintiffs failure to show even intrabrand 
effect. The court did not even use the term "market power," and it said 
that under section I, proof of "[a]n unreasonably anticompetitive effect, 
or conduct presumed under the per se rubric to have that effect, is all that 
is required."86 It did point out that interbrand competition in the case 
"appear[ed] to have been healthy,"" which might reasonably be taken to 
have expressed the view that the defendant did not have interbrand 
market power, but the court did not dispose of the case on that ground. 
Instead, it focused on the fact that the defendant-manufacturer had 
eliminated only one dealer among many," and the court made the point 
that there were an adequate number of remaining dealers to preserve 
sufficient intrabrand competition.'9 It is certainly true that if a plaintiff 
fails even to show an anticompetitive intrabrand effect it should not 
prevail, but that is so regardless of whether the defendant has interbrand 
market power. 
It is unclear how Judge Posner could have misread these cases to 
require market power. One could perhaps read the latter three cases-
Oreck, Northwest Power, and H&B Equipment-to require either 
interbrand or intrabrand market power, but one cannot reasonably read 
them to require interbrand market power. Posner's position is that 
intrabrand power is not enough; in the statement quoted above,90 he 
would not consider the intrabrand market a relevant antitrust market. 
Another of the cases cited by Posner, George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc., v. 
Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,9' does not go as far as the four cases just 
discussed, in that it does not explicitly state that market power is not 
required in a rule of reason case, but it is most fairly read to suggest so. 
The main issue in the case was whether the per se rule or rule of reason 
in the text, the court states that Northwest Power, "like Cherokee Laboratories, Inc., 
entails interbrand as well as intrabrand competition." Id. at 90. This analysis makes 
clear the point of the court's earlier statement that "[t]he market power of the defendant 
charged with a Pick-Barth violation [i.e., the substitution of one dealer for another] is 
crucial." Id. at 89. The defendants in Northwest Power included both the manufacturer 
and the substituted dealer, and the court's view was that the power of each was 
important. 
85. 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978). 
86. Id. at 243. 
87. Id. at 246. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. 
91. 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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was applicable." The court distinguished the two rules by noting the 
greater importance of market power in the per se context. It said that "a 
'rule of reason' analysis, involv[es], among other factors, a study of the 
consequences of the conduct on the affected market. . . . On the other 
hand, analysis of market power as opposed to effect is required for most 
per se violations."93 As described above, this analysis is consistent with 
the Supreme Court's requirements of market power in section 1 per se 
cases; it does not, however, advocate the use of, let alone require, market 
power in rule of reason cases. 
The final two of the seven cases come close to supporting the point for 
which Posner cites them. One of them, Gough v. Rossmoor Corp.," 
requires the plaintiff to define a relevant market in a rule of reason 
case." Definition of the relevant market is usually a step in the 
determination of market power, and later in the case the court's opinion 
could be read to suggest such a requirement.96 That suggestion comes, 
however, in the court's section 2 discussion; the court does not include 
or even suggest such a requirement in the section 1 portion of its 
opinion." Moreover, the only support the court cites for its requirement 
of market definition is a very general statement from Sylvania: "[A]n 
antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any 
objective benchmarks."" From this statement, the court draws the 
unobjectionable gloss that "[b]efore this study can even be commenced, 
however, we must know with what field of competition we are 
concerned and the dimensions of that field."99 These very general 
statements, together with the court's failure to explicitly require proof of 
92. See id. at 559. 
93. Id. 
94. 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978). 
95. See id. at 389. 
96. The court is hardly clear: 
(N]o inference of intent to monopolize can be drawn from the anticompetitive 
conduct in question unless it amounted to an unreasonable restraint of trade 
under [section] I. While conduct which would, in the case of a conspiracy, 
amount to a per se violation of [section] 1 would constitute an unreasonable 
restraint of trade without proof of market or market power, under the rule of 
reason market definition is required to establish a [section] 1 violation, as we 
have previously noted. Thus, in the absence of proof of relevant market and 
market power, the plaintiff must prove either predatory conduct or a per se 
violation of [section] I to prove an attempt to monopolize. 
Id. at 390. 
97. See R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 827 F.2d 407, 1987 
U.S. App. LEXIS 11681, at *20 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1987) (describing as "dictum" the 
statement in Gough v. Rossmoor Corp. that market power is a necessary element of a 
rule of reason claim), opinion on rehearing en bane, 890 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1989). 
98. Gough, 585 F.2d at 389, quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 
433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977). 
99. Id. 
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market power, suggest that the court's real concern was with the 
plaintiffs failure to focus carefully on the nature of the market, not on 
market power. To read the case as supporting a market power 
requirement demands at the same time a close reading of the case to find 
its mention of market power and a casual willingness to ignore the actual 
basis of its decision. 
The final case cited by Posner, which perhaps not coincidentally is the 
only district court case, Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire 
Corp.,1'"' came quite close to requiring proof of market power. What the 
case explicitly said, however, was only that market power is necessary to 
restrain competition.'°' One can accept that proposition, of course, 
without believing that proof of market power is required. 102 But the 
court did conclude that the defendant lacked power, and it appeared to 
find that fact very important.'°' It then went on, however, to describe 
why the plaintiffs claims were implausible on other grounds, '04 thus 
leading one to wonder whether an absence of market power alone would 
have been sufficient. 
In the end, it might be fair to say that Donald B. Rice, as Posner said, 
"requir[ed] that the plaintiff in a [r]ule of [r]eason case prove substantial 
market power in a relevant market."'°' It is inaccurate to say the same of 
Gough, but that case at least seemed as if it would agree with such a 
requirement. 106 The other five cases cited by Posner do not, however, 
support his point. Indeed, they all would be better cited for the 
proposition that proof of interbrand market power is not a requirement in 
section I rule of reason cases. Nevertheless, Posner's article may have 
laid the groundwork for such a requirement, as the next section shows. 
C. Valley Liquors 
The earliest case that is commonly cited for the proposition that a 
showing of market power is required is Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield 
100. 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980). 
101. See id. at 761 ("Only a firm with market power can effectively restrain 
competition."). 
102. See infra text accompanying notes 242-43. 
103. See Donald B. Rice, 483 F. Supp. at 761. 
104. See id. at 761-62. 
105. Posner, Next Step, supra note 2, at 16. 
106. Just how relevant to Posner's point that agreement would be, given that 
Gough, like Whitten, was a horizontal case and not a vertical one, is not clear. See supra 
text accompanying notes 35-36. 
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Importers, Ltd. '0' This case generated two opinions from the Seventh 
Circuit, both of which treat the market power requirement as well 
established. In the first opinion, Valley Liquors I,'°' Judge Posner said 
that because weighing the effects of interbrand competition and 
intrabrand competition was difficult, '09 courts have "looked for 
shortcuts."110 He noted that "[a] popular one is to say that the balance 
tips in the defendant's favor if the plaintiff fails to show that the 
defendant has significant market power.""' He then adopted this same 
approach for the Seventh Circuit. 111 
One might expect, since this proposition is the same one that Professor 
Posner supported only one year before by citing the cases discussed in 
the previous section, that Judge Posner would have cited some of the 
cases in Valley Liquors I. He did not. Instead, he said that requiring a 
showing of market power was "the approach of the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits," and cited one case from each circuit."' The Ninth Circuit 
case, Cowley v. Braden Industries, Inc.,"• does not impose any sort of 
market power requirement on the plaintiff; the court simply says that 
even with a showing of market power, the burden of showing that a 
restraint is unreasonable remains on the plaintiff. 1" 
The Fifth Circuit case, Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co.,116 also 
did not impose a market power requirement. To be sure, Muenster 
Butane said that market power is necessary for anticompetitive effect-
citing Posner's 1981 article11'-but that is not the question."' The 
question is whether we are willing to allow a jury to infer 
anticompetitive effect from any other evidence, or if the plaintiff must 
prove, at the outset, that the defendant has market power. Muenster 
Butane was not willing to go that far-it said only that a market power 
requirement "would have saved the litigants and the courts much 
expense."119 In fact, the court devoted most of its analysis to an 
107. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982), later proceeding, 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987). 
108. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Valley Liquors J]. The second 
opinion is discussed infra text accompanying notes 135-40. 
109. The need for such a weighing derived, he said, from a "suggestive footnote" in 
Sylvania. Valley Liquors I, 678 F.2d at 745 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.27 (1977)). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. See id. 
113. Id. 
114. 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1980). 
115. See id. at 754-56. 
116. 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981). 
117. See id. at 298. 
118. See infra text accompanying notes 242-43. 
119. Muenster Butane, 651 F.2d at 298. 
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evaluation of the competitive effects of the challenged restraints, 
concluding not only that the defendant's actions reduced undesirable 
"free-riding,"120 but that "intrabrand competition . . . continued 
unabated. " 121 In light of these conclusions, it is not surprising that the 
court did not rely on a lack of market power. 
Valley Liquors I, in contrast, did rely on the lack of market power. 122 
Oddly, though, it did not say explicitly that it was doing so. Instead, 
Posner made some academic-sounding comments about how, without 
market power, "[ e ]ven if there is some possibility [ of] ... a substantial 
anticompetitive effect, it is too small a possibility to warrant trundling 
out the great machinery of antitrust enforcement."123 And, as quoted 
above, it did not actually say that the approach it was adopting was to 
impose a threshold market power requirement, but "to say that the 
balance tips in the defendant's favor if the plaintiff fails to show ... 
significant market power. "124 This is a somewhat cryptic statement, 
especially in light of Valley Liquors I's description of Muenster Butane 
as having "held that the effects on intrabrand and on interbrand 
competition must be balanced in deciding whether a challenged 
restriction on distribution is umeasonable."'" That description is 
accurate, but a balancing approach is inconsistent with a threshold 
market power requirement. 
A market power requirement was advocated more clearly, but only in 
dictum, in other decisions, mostly from the Seventh Circuit, in the years 
following Valley Liquors I, often with opinions written by Judge Posner. 
For example, in General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing 
Ass'n,126 Judge Posner wrote that "some progress has been made toward 
giving [the rule of reason] some structure by requiring that the plaintiff 
120. Id. at 297. 
I 21. Id. at 298. 
122. See Valley Liquors I, 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982). 
123. Id. The Supreme Court has disagreed: 
A small participant in the market is, obviously, less likely to cause persistent 
damage than a large participant. ... For reasons including market inertia and 
information failures, however, a small conspirator may be able to impede 
competition over some period of time. Given an appropriate set of 
circumstances and some luck, the period can be long enough to inflict real 
injury upon particular consumers or competitors. 
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 434-35 (1990) (footnote 
omitted). 
124. Valley Liquors I, 678 F.2d at 745. 
125. Id. 
126. 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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first prove that the defendant has sufficient market power to restrain 
competition substantially."121 In support of this proposition, the decision 
cited five cases. 128 In addition to Valley Liquors I and Muenster 
Butane,1" the court cited Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Building, 
Inc. 130 and Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co. 131 from the Seventh Circuit, 
and Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp. 132 from the 
Eleventh Circuit.1" Lektro-Vend did not discuss a market power 
requirement, and although the other cases-General Leaseways, Jack 
Walters & Sons, and Graphic Products--did refer to such a requirement, 
in none of them was it necessary to the decision of the case.134 
The Seventh Circuit's first unequivocal holding that a plaintiff must 
show market power in a rule of reason case came in Valley Liquors II,1" 
three years after General Leaseways. The second opinion cited four 
cases, in addition to Valley Liquors I and General Leaseways, in support 
of its bald statement of the market-power requirement: "A threshold 
inquiry in any [r]ule of [r]eason case is whether the defendant had 
market power, that is, the 'power to raise prices significantly above the 
competitive level without losing all of one's business."'136 Of those four 
cases, three were Seventh Circuit decisions that did not in fact adopt a 
market power requirement. 137 The other case, Assam Drug Co. v. Miller 
127. Id. at 596. 
128. See id. General Leaseways also cited Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical 
Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 157-68 (1984). See 
General Leaseways, 744 F.2d at 596. 
129. Not among the citations was Cowley v. Braden Industries, Inc., 613 F.2d 751 
(9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit case that Valley Liquors I incorrectly said adopted a 
market power requirement. See Cowley, 613 F.2d at 755 (rejecting claims of a market 
power requirement). 
130. 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984). 
131. 660F.2d255 (7th Cir. 1981). 
132. 7 I 7 F.2d 1560 (I Ith Cir. 1983). 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13. 
134. The concurrence in Jack Walters & Sons pointed this out: 
Unfortunately, I cannot concur in much of the discussion contained in the 
majority opinion, not because that discussion may not state correct principles 
of law, but because I believe it is dicta--<licta that might tend to influence and 
prejudice decisions in cases yet unborn but which may come to this court for 
review. 
Jack Walters & Sons, 737 F.2d at 713 (Swygert, J., concurring). 
135. 822 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Valley Liquors II]. 
136. Id. at 666 (quoting Valley Liquors I, 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
137. See Hennessy Indus. Inc. v. FMC Corp., 779 F.2d 402, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984). Actually, 
far from supporting the court's point, these cases provide further examples of the 
peculiarities in the rhetorical development of the market power requirement. First, Polk 
Bros. cited Brunswick in support of this statement: 'The first step in any [r]ule of 
[r]eason case is an assessment of market power." Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 191. Then, 
Hennessy made the following statement: 'This court held in [Brunswick] that 'the first 
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Brewing Co.,1" was from the Eighth Circuit, and, as discussed below, 139 
Assam Drug did indeed adopt a market power requirement. It is 
therefore the first case the Seventh Circuit cites from another circuit that 
clearly does so, "0 and it is significant that when it became available, the 
Seventh Circuit not only ceased including its earlier, more questionable 
citations, but also-finally-explicitly adopted the requirement itself. 
Here, then, are the steps in the development of the market power 
requirement through Valley Liquors I and//: 
1. Professor Posner writes an article claiming that "some courts" 
have adopted a market power requirement, and cites seven cases. 
In fact, only one of those cases, a district court case, is fairly 
described as having adopted such a requirement, though one other 
of the cases might perhaps have been willing to do so. Five of the 
cases appear to disagree with the requirement. 141 
2. Muenster Butane says that a market power requirement would be 
appropriate (though it does not adopt one), citing only the 
misleading Posner article. Muenster Butane does not cite any of 
the cases cited in the Posner article. 142 
3. In Valley Liquors I, Judge Posner says that a "popular" shortcut is 
a market power requirement, citing two cases, one of which 
step in any [r]ule of [r]eason case is an assessment of market power."' Hennessy, 779 
F.2d at 404-05 (apparently quoting Brunswick). However, Brunswick did not hold, let 
alone state, anything of the son. Brunswick (written by Judge Posner) was a section 2 
case based on patent fraud, and though Brunswick said, as one would expect in that 
context, that "[t]he patent must dominate a real market," Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 265, 
that holding simply has nothing to do with the rule of reason under section I. In Polk 
Bros. (written by Judge Easterbrook), there was also no rule of reason claim, the plaintiff 
having proceeded only under the per se rule. Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 191. Hence, Judge 
Easterbrook's comments on the rule of reason were dicta. Finally, although Hennessy 
did involve a rule of reason claim, its comments on market power were not made in the 
context of that claim. See Hennessy, 779 F.2d at 404. Instead, they were made in the 
context of what the court called a "claim for a [r]ule of [r]eason violation under [s]ection 
2." Id. Putting aside the fact that section 2 claims generally are not called "rule of 
reason" claims, there is no question that market power-actually, monopoly power, or 
the dangerous probability of it-must be proved under section 2. See supra text 
accompanying notes 44-55. But that says nothing about the rule under section I. 
138. 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986). 
I 39. See infra Part IV .B. 
140. Subsequently, however, the Eighth Circuit retreated from its requirement of a 
showing of market power, see infra Part IV.B, and a very recent Seventh Circuit case, 
Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass 'n, 95 F.3d 593 
(7th Cir. 1996), cited only other Seventh Circuit cases. 
141. See supra Part III.B. 
142. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text. 
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imposes no such requirement and the other of which is Muenster 
Butane. Despite having only two cases (and only one that comes 
close to being a valid one) to cite for what he says is a popular 
position, Posner does not cite any of the cases that he said in his 
earlier article adopted that position. 143 
4. Jack Walters & Sons from the Seventh Circuit and Graphic 
Products from the Eleventh Circuit advocate a market power 
requirement in dictum. General Leaseways then cites those two 
cases in advocating the requirement in dictum.144 
5. Assam Drug adopts a market power requirement for the Eighth 
Circuit, relying, as discussed below, on Posner's 1981 article and 
a number of cases, none of which themselves clearly adopted such 
a requirement. 145 
6. Valley Liquors II cites five Seventh Circuit cases that do not 
clearly adopt a market power requirement and Assam Drug in 
adopting-for the first time in the Seventh Circuit-the market 
• 146 power reqmrement. 
The sequence of events is striking: the Seventh Circuit built support for 
a market power requirement by questionable citations in early cases, 
dropping those citations in favor of more valid ones as other cases came 
closer to adopting the requirement, often relying on Seventh Circuit 
precedent, until finally, after Assam Drug clearly adopted the 
requirement, the Seventh Circuit did so as well. 
IV. THE MARKET POWER REQUIREMENT IN THE CIRCUITS 
In the years following Valley Liquors I, several other circuits adopted 
or came close to adopting a market power requirement. Indeed, it has 
been claimed that the requirement became a more or less general one: 
"[i]n vertical nonprice cases, most courts of appeals have required a 
plaintiff to make a threshold showing that the defendant imposing the 
restrictions had market gower in order to establish the required adverse 
effect on competition."1 7 As will be seen below, however, the adoption 
of the requirement has been far less general and far more equivocal than 
143. See supra notes 107-25 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text. 
145. See infra note 175. 
146. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text. 
147. Appeal of Toys "R" Us, Inc. to the FfC (Public Record Version) at 49, Docket 
No. 9278 (Nov. 20, 1997) (citing Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1231 
(8th Cir. 1987); Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 
(7th Cir. 1986); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568 (11th 
Cir.1983) ). 
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is commonly believed, and even where such a requirement has been 
adopted, the adoption generally has not been accompanied by careful 
analysis. 
In fact, the courts' adoptions of a market power requirement have not 
always shown the expected respect for binding precedent. Despite the 
Supreme Court's explicit rejection of the requirement in Indiana 
Federation of Dentists,"' two circuits retain it. One could perhaps 
imagine that a court would retain the requirement for vertical cases, but 
reject it for horizontal ones, since Indiana Federation of Dentists was 
horizontal (as was NCAA, which also rejected the requirement), and 
vertical cases are generally viewed as presenting less danger to 
competition. But Indiana Federation of Dentists applied its rule not 
only to the rule of reason in horizontal cases, but also to the rule 
generally, and it might have been appropriate to do so.1' 9 
In any event, the courts that have flouted Indiana Federation of 
Dentists have not drawn on the distinction between horizontal and 
vertical cases, nor has the antitrust commentary. For example, the ABA 
Antitrust Section's Antitrust Law Developments said in 1997 that 
"[c]ourts have generally held that proof of a defendant's market power is 
an absolute prerequisite for a plaintiff seeking to use market analysis to 
satisfy its burden of proving likely anticompetitive effect."1' 0 Perhaps 
the restriction of this statement to plaintiffs "seeking to use market 
analysis" is intended to suggest that the statement is confined only to 
plaintiffs that do not show actual anticompetitive effects, thus 
conforming to the views of the Supreme Court, but the statement makes 
no distinction between horizontal and vertical cases. 
The two circuits-the Seventh and Fourth-that have continued to 
require market power despite the Supreme Court's rejection of such a 
requirement are discussed in the first section below. The second section 
discusses the two circuits-the Sixth and Eighth-that adopted a market 
requirement in the wake of Valley Liquors I, but abandoned it after 
Indiana Federation of Dentists. The third section describes how the 
Fifth, District of Columbia, Eleventh, and Tenth Circuits have come 
close to adopting a market power requirement, without quite doing so. 
The fourth section discusses two circuits-the First and Ninth-that 
flirted with a market power requirement in isolated early cases, but then 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
150. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 10, at 60. 
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rejected it on their own. Finally, there are the Second and Third 
Circuits, which never adopted a market power requirement. Indeed, in a 
recent case the Third Circuit appeared to express an understanding of the 
requirement as a broadening, rather than a narrowing, of potential 
antitrust liability. 
A. Circuits that Have Adopted and Maintained a 
Market Power Requirement 
Of the two circuits that appear to have maintained a market power 
requirement even in the face of the Supreme Court's rejection of such a 
requirement, only one has explained why. Not surprisingly, that circuit 
is the Seventh. In Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n,1l 1 the Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged that Indiana Federation of Dentists said that proof 
of anticompetitive effects "can obviate the need for an inquiry into 
market power,'' 152 and it said that the Wilk district court's "findings 
eliminated the need for an inquiry into market power."153 The court also 
said, however, consistent with earlier Seventh Circuit decisions, that 
"[t]he threshold issue in any rule of reason case is market power."154 The 
Seventh Circuit has recently reaffirmed that position.1ll 
The Wilk court apparently felt that it could reconcile the Supreme 
Court's views with its own in this statement: "The district court also 
relied on substantial evidence of adverse effects on competition caused 
by the boycott to establish the [defendant's] market power."156 In other 
words, if the plaintiff offers proof of actual detrimental effects, that 
proof is also proof of market power, and thus meets the threshold market 
power requirement. But this eliminates any independent role for market 
power, because independent proof of market power is not necessary. 1" 
151. 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990). 
152. Id. at 360 (quoting FfC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 
(1986)). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 359. 
155. "Substantial market power is an indispensable ingredient of every claim under 
the full [r]ule of [r]eason." Chicago Prof! Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball 
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593,600 (7th Cir. 1996). 
156. Wilks, 895 F.2d at 360. 
157. This can present a problem, of course, if the effects at issue are not clearly 
anticompetitive. Consider a recent Australian case, Me/way Publishing Pty. Ltd. v 
Rohen Hicks Pty. Ltd., No. VG 638 of 1998 (Aust!. Fed. Ct., Viet. Dist. Registry May 
20, 1999) (LEXIS, Aust. Library FCUNR File), in which the court considered a statute 
providing that "[a] corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall 
not take advantage of that power for the purpose of ... deterring or preventing a person 
from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other market." Id. The defendant, a 
monopolist, had withheld its goods from a former dealer, thus preventing it from 
competing, so the only question was whether it had "take[n] advantage of' its power. 
26 
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For the court then to continue to insist that proof of market power is a 
threshold requirement is disingenuous, and seems calculated more to 
mislead than to guide litigants. 
Although the Fourth Circuit has also affirmed a market power 
requirement since Indiana Federation of Dentists, it has made no 
attempt to reconcile its requirement with the Supreme Court's 
statements. Oddly, the Fourth Circuit did not even adopt such a 
requirement until after Indiana Federation of Dentists."' First, in 
Military Services Realty, Inc. v. Realty Consultants of Virginia, Ltd., 159 it 
said that "[i]n proving a [s]ection 1 violation, the plaintiff must show the 
market shares of the competitors in the relevant market."'"' This seems 
to require only that the shares of the defendant be put before the court, 
not that the defendant be proven to have a large share. The following 
sentence supports this interpretation: "Facts must be presented to the 
court to enable it to ascertain the market power of the defendant both 
before and after the alleged anti-competitive conduct."161 But 
subsequently, in Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville 
Furniture Industries, Inc., 162 the Fourth Circuit said that "[a] threshold 
inquiry in any [r]ule of [r]eason case is whether the defendant had 
market power."'" 
See id. Two of the three judges concluded that it had, because, they said, if the 
defendant had not been a monopolist, it would not have withheld the goods and allowed 
competitors to supply them. See id. The problem here is that it is not clear that the 
prevention of the dealer from entering the market, which was an intrabrand restraint, was 
in fact anticompetitive. If it was not, then the inference that market power was the 
source of that conduct would not necessarily be accurate. 
This, of course, is the basic motivation for an independent market power requirement. 
The problem in Me/way, though, was that the statute at issue did not forbid 
anticompetitive conduct, but forbade "preventing a person from engaging in competitive 
conduct in that or any other market," which, if that other market was an intrabrand one, 
might not be anticompetitive. Id. The rule of reason under section I of the Sherman Act 
forbids only anticompetitive conduct, so that a finding of anticompetitive conduct 
implies market power. 
158. However, a district court decision from the Fourth Circuit adopted a market 
power requirement even before Valley Liquors I. See supra text accompanying notes 
100-04. 
159. 823 F.2d 829 (4th Cir. 1987). 
160. Id. at 832 (citing Northwest Power Co. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 89 (5th 
Cir. 1978)). 
161. Id. (citing Havoco of Am., LTD. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 558 (7th Cir. 
1980)). 
162. 889 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1989) 
163. Id. at 528 (quoting Valley Liquors/, 822 F.2d 656, 666 (7th Cir. 1982); citing 
Military Services Realty, 823 F.2d at 832; Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire 
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It is hard to know what to make of these decisions. The Seventh 
Circuit in Wilk acknowledged Indiana Federation of Dentists, but 
seemed to try to avoid, rather than accept, the Supreme Court's views on 
a market power requirement. Additionally, later Seventh Circuit cases 
and the Fourth Circuit have required plaintiffs to show market power 
without even making any attempt to explain how such a requirement can 
be reconciled with the Supreme Court's views. One hopes that if a 
plaintiff made a satisfactory showing of anticompetitive effects without 
first providing independent proof of market power, these courts would 
accept that showing as meeting the plaintiffs initial burden, but their 
words suggest otherwise. 
B. Circuits that Have Adopted but Abandoned a 
Market Power Requirement 
The Eighth Circuit, and probably the Sixth Circuit, also at one time 
adopted market power requirements. As described briefly above, 164 the 
Eighth Circuit became the first court of appeals to clearly and 
unequivocally adopt a threshold market power requirement in Assam 
Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co. 165 The Sixth Circuit has been somewhat 
less clear, but in Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 166 the court 
upheld a jury instruction that apparently required the jury to find that the 
defendant had "substantial market power."167 The appeals court 
introduced some ambiguity in stating that "[t]he district court ... 
properly instructed the jury to consider [the defendant's] market 
power,"168 but the court later indicated, though again with some lack of 
clarity, that a showing of market power is required. 169 
Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 761 (D. Md. 1980), ajf'd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981)); see 
supra text accompanying notes I 00-04. 
164. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40. 
165. 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986). The court was explicit: 
The market power approach is a proper method of evaluating vertical 
nonprice restraints under the rule of reason and is an appropriate basis for 
summary judgment in such a case. If [the defendant] lacks market power, the 
territorial restraints it imposed on [its distributor] cannot have an 
anticompetitive effect on interbrand competition. We agree with the district 
court that [the plaintiff] has raised no genuine issue of material fact to deter the 
conclusion that [the defendant] lacks market power. Accordingly, we affirm 
the summary judgment. 
Id. at 319 (footnote omitted). Note that Assam Drug required a showing of market 
power only in rule of reason challenges to vertical nonprice restraints. 
166. 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982). 
167. Id. at 1202. 
168. Id. (emphasis added). 
169. See Hand v. Central Transport, Inc., 779 F.2d 8, II (6th Cir. 1985) (citing 
Davis-Watkins, 686 F.2d at 1202). The ambiguity arose from the court's statement that 
"[a] defendant must have market power before its conduct can be shown to have an 
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Both courts explicitly abandoned their market power requirements 
following Indiana Federation of Dentists."0 The Sixth Circuit recently 
went even further, in two respects, in Re/Max International, Inc. v. 
Realty One, Inc. 171 First, it stated that after Indiana Federation of 
Dentists, a plaintiff in a rule of reason case was neither required to prove 
market power nor define a relevant market. 172 Second, Re/Max adopted a 
monopoly power rule for section 2 similar to the section 1 market power 
rule from Indiana Federation of Dentists, stating that a plaintiff that 
shows the actual anticompetitive effects of monopoly power need not 
provide independent proof of monopoly power. 173 This approach seems 
directly contrary to the Supreme Court's test for monopolization set out 
in Grinnell. 114 
Putting aside this section 2 holding, the patterns of decision in the 
Eighth and Sixth Circuits are exactly what one would expect from courts 
that adopted market power requirements. One could wish that the courts 
had engaged in more careful analysis in initially adopting the 
requirement,1" but each quickly recognized and conformed to the 
adverse effect on competition," Hand, 779 F.2d at 11, which falls slightly short of 
explicitly requiring the plaintiff to make an independent showing of market power. 
170. See Flegel v. Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 
1993); Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567,570 (6th Cir. 1992). 
171. 173 F.3d 995 (6th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3138 (Aug. 
17, 1999)(No. 99-294). 
172. See id. at 1014. 
173. See id. at 1018 ("We agree that an antitrust plaintiff is not required to rely on 
indirect evidence of a defendant's monopoly power, such as high market share within a 
defined market, when there is direct evidence that the defendant has actually set prices or 
excluded competition."); see also supra text accompanying notes 44-55. 
174. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46. 
175. See, e.g., Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 315-16 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (relying on the purely theoretical point that without power no anticompetitive 
effect is possible and on its claim that "[s)ome courts" had previously adopted such a 
requirement); see also infra text accompanying notes 242-43. Of the cases that the 
Assam Drug court cited, however, none clearly did adopt the requirement. It cited cases 
already discussed in this Article: General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing 
Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984); Graphic Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek 
Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (I Ith Cir. 1983); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 
686 F.2d 1190, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); Valley Liquors I, 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 
1982); and Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981). The 
decision also cited Rothery Storage & Van. Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 
212 (D.C. Cir. 1986) and O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274, 1291 
(C.D. Cal. 1985), ajf'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming the lower court's 
decision, but declining to adopt the requirement). For additional discussion, see infra 
Part IV.E. 
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rejection of it by the Supreme Court.176 The section 2 holding of Re/Max 
probably goes too far, however; in that regard, it is consistent with the 
loose reasoning of other courts in the market power context. As 
described above,177 the section 2 context of unilateral conduct is 
significantly different from the section I context. It is inappropriate to 
casually extend a rule forgoing a showing of market power from section 
1 to section 2, just as it is inappropriate to extend a rule requiring it from 
section 2 to section 1. 
C. Circuits that Have Almost Adopted a Market Power Requirement 
Four of the circuits that are often cited as having adopted a market 
power requirement never quite did so explicitly. The Fifth Circuit's 
decision in Muenster Butane is discussed above,178 and is interestingly 
similar to D.C. Circuit and Tenth Circuit cases that are frequently cited 
as supporting a market power requirement. Like Muenster Butane, both 
the D.C. Circuit opinion, Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 
Inc.,"' and the Tenth Circuit opinion, SCFC /LC, Inc. v. VISA USA, 
Inc. ,1•0 devoted much discussion to how challenged restraints enhanced 
efficiency by eliminating free riding. 1" As in Muenster Butane, both 
circuit courts suggested that a market power requirement would be a 
good idea but did not adopt one. Recall that Muenster Butane held that 
such a re~uirement would have "saved the litigants and the courts much 
expense." 82 Similarly, the Rothery court said that its decision in favor of 
the defendant "might well rest, therefore, upon the absence of market 
power,"183 but it did not rest on that absence.184 SCFC said that "many 
courts" had imposed a market power requirement, while only citing 
Valley Liquors //. 185 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit observed that this 
approach had become "helpful,"186 but it did not explicitly adopt this 
approach for itself, despite concluding that the evidence of market power 
176. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 116-21. 
179. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
180. 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994). 
181. See Rothery, 792 F.2d at 221-23; SCFC, 36 F.3d at 969-72. The further 
examination in SCFC is consistent with the court's statement that "whether a firm 
possesses market power may facilitate the determination that the practice harms 
competition and not simply a single competitor." Id. at 965 (emphasis added). 
182. Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292,298 (5th Cir. 1981). 
183. Rothery, 792 F.2d at 221. 
184. See id. 
185. SCFC, 36 F.3d at 965. 
186. Id. 
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In the Eleventh Circuit, uncertainty developed from a somewhat 
different source. An Eleventh Circuit case, Graphic Products 
Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp.,188 is also cited often in support of a 
market power requirement. Graphic Products interpreted Muenster 
Butane to have "insist[ed], at the threshold" on a showing of market 
power in a vertical case.1" Because Muenster Butane was a pre-Fifth 
Circuit-split case, Graphic Products treated such a showing as required 
in the Eleventh Circuit, post-split, as well. But the Graphic Products 
court concluded that the plaintiff had met its burden of showing market 
power,1'° so Graphic Products is not an instance of a dismissal for 
failure to show market power. Moreover, th_e only subsequent Eleventh 
Circuit case to cite Graphic Products for the market power issue is 
unclear. 191 An even later Eleventh Circuit case treated the market power 
issue as unresolved.192 
The equivocal nature of these decisions has not gone entirely 
unnoticed. 193 The interesting question, though, is why they have so often 
187. See id. at 969. 
188. 7!7F.2d !560(llthCir. 1983). 
189. Id. at 1568; see id. at 1568-69 (citing Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 
651 F.2d 292,298 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
190. See id. at 1571. 
191. See L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414 (I Ith Cir. 
1984). The L.A. Draper court said that '"[a]n antitrust plaintiff ... makes out a prima 
facie case under the rule of reason only upon proof of a well-defined relevant market 
upon which the challenged anticompetitive actions would have substantial impact."' Id. 
at 422 (quoting Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.Zd 954, 962 (5th Cir. 1978), 
vacated by stipulation of the parties, 591 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). This statement suggests only that market definition, not proof of market 
power, is necessary. 
192. See National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 
1986). The Eleventh Circuit said that "[ w ]hether the court, in applying the rule of 
reason, must weigh the market power of the antitrust defendant is a curiously confused 
and uncertain area of the law." Id. at 603. It also said that "[c]ases can be cited for both 
sides of the proposition," but cited neither Graphic Products nor L.A. Draper. Id. 
193. See K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129 
(2d Cir. 1995) (describing Rothery as "suggesting that a showing of market power is a 
strict prerequisite to recovery in all [section] 1 cases"); see also SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA 
USA, 36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that in Rothery, "the D.C. Circuit 
rejected plaintiffs' claim, based not simply on the evidence [the defendant] did not 
possess market power ... but also on the conclusion the new rule ... enhanc[ed] 
consumer welfare by creating efficiency"); R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. 
Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 164 (9th Cir. 1989) (Thompson, J., dissenting) 
(describing Rothery as relying on absence of market power in rejecting section 1 claim 
under rule of reason analysis, but not including it among cases that require a showing of 
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been cited as having required a showing of market power when they did 
not in fact do so, or at least did not do so clearly. This question is even 
more interesting in light of the fact that, as with the Eleventh Circuit, 
none of the others has reaffirmed its purported imposition of a market 
power requirement. Although most of the post-Muenster Butane cases 
in the Fifth Circuit have emphasized the importance of interbrand 
competition, 194 only one of them seems to require that the plaintiff show 
market power, and that one does so only by what is probably 
typographical error."' Despite frequent citations to Rothery elsewhere, 
the D.C. Circuit apparently has not subsequently cited it in support of a 
market power requirement. The issue apparently has not yet arisen again 
in the Tenth Circuit since the 1994 SCFC decision. 
Whether these circuits will recognize the Supreme Court's rejection of 
a market power requirement is not certain, except in the Eleventh 
Circuit, which has done so.196 The Fifth Circuit has not discussed the 
implications of Indiana Federation of Dentists, but since, as discussed 
above, the Fifth Circuit may not itself have been committed to a market 
power requirement, it may be that no alteration in its views is required. 
market power). 
194. See, e.g., Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 
1005 (5th Cir. 1981); Daniels v. All Steel Equip., Inc., 590 F.2d Ill, 113-14 (5th Cir. 
1979). Red Diamond almost says that proof of less intrabrand competition is not enough. 
See Red Diamond, 637 F.2d at 1005. This could be read to require that a plaintiff also 
prove a reduction in interbrand competition, which in tum might be read to require that a 
plaintiff prove an increase in market power. However, a later case, Mendelovitz v. 
Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1982), says that proof of injury to intrabrand 
competition alone, in limited circumstances, is enough to meet the plaintiff's initial 
burden. See id. at 57 5. 
195. See Hornsby Oil Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 714 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 
1983). The Hornsby court cited Muenster Butane in support of the statement that 
"[a]bsent proof of a diminution [sic] in interbrand market power [sic]... a 
manufacturer's termination of a single distributor does not contravene the antitrust laws." 
ld. at 1394. The court must either have meant to say "a diminution in interbrand 
competition" or "an increase in interbrand market power." Judging from the context of 
the statement, where the same paragraph referred to "[al reduction in intrabrand 
competition," id., the court probably meant to refer to a "diminution in interbrand 
competition." If so, that would leave open the possibility that a plaintiff could prove the 
reduction in interbrand competition without directly proving market power. 
Alternatively, the court might have meant to refer to "an increase in interbrand market 
power," in which it would have required proof of market power. But such a statement 
would go even farther than other statements of the market power requirement, in that it 
would presumably require proof of an increase in market power. 
196. See Levine v. Central Florida Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538 (I Ith Cir. 
1996). The Levine court took notice of Indiana Federation of Dentists in stating that 
"[i]n order to prove an anticompetitive effect on the market, the plaintiff may either 
prove that the defendants' behavior had an 'actual detrimental effect' on competition, or 
that the behavior had 'the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.'" Id. at 
1551 (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986)). It is 
only if the plaintiff chooses to prove the latter that it must prove market power. See id. 
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The Tenth Circuit's decision in SCFC is more recent than Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, so even if it is not clear that it required market 
power, it appears to be more sympathetic to such a requirement than one 
would expect. Finally, although the D.C. Circuit in Superior Court Trial 
Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC' 91 noted that there would have been no need for a 
showing of market power if "there were no countervailing 
procompetitive justifications for [a] facially anticompetitive boycott,"'" 
the elimination of the market power requirement for facially competitive 
practices is only one aspect of NCAA and Indiana Federation of 
Dentists.'"' The other aspect is the elimination of the requirement when 
the plaintiff shows actual anticompetitive effects; the D.C. Circuit did 
not mention that possibility, making unclear how it would treat such a 
h · 200 s owmg. 
D. Circuits that Have Experimented with a Market Power Requirement 
Courts in both the First and Ninth Circuits initially seemed to adopt 
197. 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev"d in pan. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
198. Id. at 249. 
199. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61; NCAA v. Board of 
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984). 
200. The D.C. Circuit apparently favors a market power requirement in certain 
circumstances. In Superior Coan Trial Lawyers, it relied on the peculiar nature of the 
boycott in imposing such a requirement, holding "that the evidentiary shortcut to 
antitrust condemnation without proof of market power is inappropriate as applied to a 
boycott that served, in part, to make a statement on a matter of public debate." Superior 
Coun Trial Lawyers, 856 F.2d at 250. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
challenged boycott was per se illegal. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 
493 U.S. 411,436 (1990). 
Interestingly, in the same year the Supreme Court somewhat similarly reversed an 
Eleventh Circuit decision, Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 874 F.2d 1417 (11th Cir. 
1990), rev'd, 498 U.S. 46 (1990). In that decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 
district court decision that had rejected the plaintiffs' effort to meet their burden through 
proof that the defendants' agreement had caused actual anticompetitive effects, by 
introducing evidence of a "dramatic price increase" following the challenged agreement. 
Id. at 1437 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissent objected, pointing out that under Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, the plaintiffs were permitted to show actual detrimental effects, 
and did not have to provide a detailed market analysis. See id. at 1436-37 n.26 (Clark, J., 
dissenting). Again, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the challenged restraint 
was per se illegal. See Palmer, 498 U.S. at 50. 
Of course, the question of whether the per se rule or the rule of reason is applicable is 
not the same question as whether a showing of market power is required under the rule 
of reason. So, although it is not clear whether the Court's reversals in these decisions 
have broader implications for a requirement of market power, they certainly do not 
suggest that the Court is willing to expand the role of market power. 
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market power requirements when other courts were doing so, but both 
circuits later apparently abandoned the requirement. 201 The relevant First 
Circuit case was CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.,202 which said that "[i]n order 
to prove a contract or combination in restraint of trade in violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must . . . prove that the 
defendant had market power in the relevant market, and the specific 
intent to restrain competition."203 The relevant case from the Ninth 
Circuit was a California district court case, O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple 
Computer, Inc.,204 which said that "[a]bsent significant market power, a 
vertical restriction is reasonable as a matter of law."205 Although this 
statement falls somewhat short of requiring the plaintiff to prove market 
power in that it does not clearly place the burden of proof on the 
plaintiff, the court probably intended to impose a market power 
• 206 reqmrement. 
These two cases and their later treatment share interesting similarities. 
First, each court's statement came in a context that made it less than 
compelling. In CYD, the problem was that in the same sentence that it 
required a showing of market power, the court also said that section 1 
requires a specific intent to restrain competition,'0' which is clearly 
201. The same could perhaps be said of the Fifth Circuit. See supra text 
accompanying notes 194-95. 
202. 769 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1985). Courts and commentators have incorrectly said 
that other First Circuit cases adopted a market power requirement. Professor Posner in 
his 1981 article cited George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc., v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 
F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), as having adopted a market power requirement when it did not. 
See supra text accompanying notes 91-93. O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. 
Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1985), affd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986), cited Bruce Drug, 
Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1982), as having adopted such a 
requirement when it did not. Bruce Drug said that the defendant's actions "ha[d] the 
overall effect of promoting vigorous interbrand competition," so that the court "[was] 
unable to find that [the defendant's] conduct diminishe[d] intrabrand competition 
without producing significant benefits for interbrand competition." Bruce Drug, 688 
F.2d at 860. 
203. CVD, 769 F.2d at 851. 
204. 601 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986). 
205. Id. at 1291 n.8 (citing Bruce Drug, 688 F.2d at 859-60; Davis-Watkins Co. v. 
Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. 
Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
206. See Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 315-16 (8th Cir. 
I 986) ( citing O.S. C. Corp. as among the courts that "have narrowed the unlimited 
inquiry necessary under the rule of reason by requiring at the threshold that the plaintiff 
attacking a vertical nonprice restraint prove the defendant's substantial market power in 
a relevant market"). Even the Ninth Circuit cites it as having adopted the requirement. 
See R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 827 F.2d 407, 1987 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 11681, at *19-20 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1987) (citing O.S.C. Corp. as one of the 
courts requiring that "[i]n the first step, the claimant must demonstrate that the 
conspirators had significant market power''), opinion on rehearing en bane, 890 F.2d 
I 39 (9th Cir. I 989). 
207. See CVD, 769 F.2d at 851. 
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incorrect. This casts doubt on the court's care in making the statement. 
One explanation is that CVD involved primarily a claim of attempted 
monopolization,208 for which specific intent is required.",. Thus, the 
court may have been confusing the requirements for the two claims.210 
Similarly, O.S.C. was also speaking outside the context of the rule of 
reason. Because the case apparently presented only a per se claim211 and 
its imposition of a market power requirement appeared in a footnote, the 
court was apparently only indulging a desire to expound upon the 
antitrust merits of the case. 
Second, the statements of both courts were ignored by later court of 
appeals cases. First Circuit cases after CVD have neither required a 
showing of market power nor referred to CVD's apparent imposition of 
such a requirement.212 A few district courts in the First Circuit have 
adopted a market power requirement, but with one exception, even they 
have not cited CVD in support of it.213 For example, Winter Hill Frozen 
Foods & Services, Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co. 214 said that "[w]here there 
are vertical nonprice restraints, some circuits have ruled that a threshold 
inquiry in rule of reason analysis is whether the defendant has market 
208. The case alleged a bad-faith assertion of trade secrets, and the court primarily 
cited other cases under section 2 that alleged bad-faith assertions of intellectual property. 
See id. at 849 (citing Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 
U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952)). 
209. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,456 (1993). 
210. Moreover, the court found that the defendant did in fact have market power, so 
the court's comments on market power were not necessary to its decision. See CVD, 769 
F.2d at 851. 
211. See O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274, 1291 n.8 (C.D. 
Cal. 1985), ajf'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that the plaintiff had not pleaded 
anticompetitive effect). 
212. See Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 
1998); Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); Monahan's Marine, Inc., v. Boston 
Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1989). 
213. The exception, Norte Car Corp. v. Firstbank Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.P.R. 
1998), cites CVD in support of imposing a market power requirement. See Norte Car, 25 
F. Supp. 2d at 21. But in Norte Car, the plaintiff had not even pied market power, and 
the court dismissed the case without prejudice, with leave to replead. See id. at 21. 
Another district court case, Shepherd Intelligence Systems, Inc. v. Defense 
Technologies, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 365 (D. Mass. 1988), may also assume that proof of 
market power is required, though it refers only to a pleading requirement. In Shepherd, 
the court said that "[t]he defendants also argue that Shepherd has failed to plead 
substantial market power in the relevant market as required by sec[tion] 1 or a dangerous 
probability of success in monopolizing the relevant market as required by sec[tion] 2." 
Id. at 369 (citing CVD, 769 F.2d at 851). 
214. 691 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1988). 
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power. "21 ' However, it cited only Assam Drug from the Eighth Circuit 
and Hennessy Industries, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,216 from the Seventh 
Circuit.21 ' Subsequent district court cases in the First Circuit either 
mention but do not apply a market power requirement,'1' refer to a need 
to consider market power but do not make it a requirement,219 or impose 
such a requirement without citing CVD or any other First Circuit case.220 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the O.S.C. holding,221 but did not repeat the 
district court's market power observations. The Ninth Circuit instead 
noted that "[t]he evidence showed that competition was intense before 
and increased after the [ challenged restraint] was adopted. "222 This 
appears to be an assessment of anticompetitive effect. Moreover, later 
Ninth Circuit cases do not treat the market power requirement as 
established in the circuit. Although one Ninth Circuit case did state that 
ordinarily the existence of market power is an essential ingredient in a 
rule of reason case,"' another case observed that "[o]ur court has not 
adopted a specific test for demonstrating in section [ 1] cases that a 
conspiracy has had a substantial anticompetitive effect. "224 More recent 
cases have made clear that no showing of market power is required after 
215. Id. at 547. 
216. 779 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1985). 
217. See Haagen Dazs, 691 F. Supp. at 547 (citing Assam Drug Co. v. Miller 
Brewing Co. 798 F.2d 311, 315-16 (8th Cir. 1986); Hennessy Indus., 779 F.2d at 
404-05). 
218. See Healthco lnt'l, Inc. v. A-dee, Inc., 1989 WL 104064, at *3, 4-6 (D. Mass. 
Apr. 17, 1989). 
219. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 1992 WL 59713, at *5-8 
(D.N.H. Jan. 30, 1992), ajf'd, U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 
(1st Cir. 1993). 
220. See Holmes Prods. Corp. v. Dana Lighting, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 27, 32 (D. Mass. 
1997) (stating that "a vertical restraint would, absent market power on defendant's part, 
be perfectly legal," but citing only Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
36, 54-55 (1977), and Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), in 
support of that statement); see also Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888 
F. Supp. 274, 283 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that "[a]n essential element of every rule of 
reason claim is a showing that the defendants exercised market power in some relevant 
market," but citing no cases in support of that statement); AT&T Co. v. IMR Capital 
Corp., 888 F. Supp. 221, 252 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that "[a]s a preliminary matter, ... 
the plaintiff in such a [rule of reason] case must first demonstrate that the defendant is 
capable of causing antitrust harm by showing that it (the defendant) can exercise 'market 
power' in the relevant market," and citing tying cases from the First Circuit, a Seventh 
Circuit case, Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247,251 
(7th Cir. 1994), and district court cases). 
221. O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 792 F.2d 1464, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986). 
222. Id. at 1469. 
223. See Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1988). 
224. R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 827 F.2d 407, 1987 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 11681, at *19 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1987), opinion on rehearing en bane, 890 
F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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The explanations for these two short-lived adoptions of a market 
power requirement appear to be very different. In CVD, the explanation 
seems simply to have been carelessness: the court cited no support for its 
imposition of the requirement and it did not play an important role in the 
case.226 In O.S.C., the explanation appears to have been exactly the 
opposite. Despite the fact that market power was not at issue, because 
the plaintiff was apparently pursuing a per se price-fixing case,221 the 
court took the opportunity to write a 1300-word footnote on the role of 
market power under the rule of reason. The court seems to have gotten 
caught up in the early market power rhetoric, in that it cites many of the 
early cases.22' As noted above, although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court, it did not affirm on the market power issue.229 
E. Circuits that Have Never Adopted a Market Power Requirement 
As described above, although Judge Posner claimed the Second 
Circuit to have imposed a market power requirement in Oreck, that 
opinion in fact better supports the opposite position.230 Recently, in 
K.M.B. Warehouse Distributors, Inc. v. Walker Manufacturing Co.,231 the 
Second Circuit made its position quite clear: "This court has not made a 
showing of market power a prerequisite for recovery in all [section] 1 
cases. If a plaintiff can show an actual adverse effect on competition, 
such as reduced output, we do not require a further showing of market 
power."2' 2 The Third Circuit's approach has been similar. Early on, in 
Harold Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Markets lnc.,233 the Third Circuit said 
225. See, e.g., Nestle Food Co. v. Abbott Lab., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 494, at *7 
(9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1997); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991). 
226. See CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 851 (1st Cir. 1985). The claim 
at issue was one by former employees of a corporation that the corporation had asserted 
trade secrets in bad faith, and the court focused on the trade secret issues. See id. at 847-
48. The court resolved the market power issue in one sentence noting that the jury's 
finding of market power was "amply supported by the evidence." Id. at 851. 
227. See O.S.C., 601 F. Supp. at 1292. The court noted that the plaintiff had not 
pied anticompetitive effect. See id. at 1291 n.8. 
228. See id. 
229. See supra note 175. 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80. 
231. 61 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1995). 
232. Id. at 129 (citation omitted) (citing FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 
447, 460-61 (1986); Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 
537,546 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
233. 587 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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of the factors on which the rule of reason turns that "no single aspect is 
dispositive."234 It has held this view consistentlt'235 Recently, it 
reaffirmed it in United States v. Brown University,23 where it said that 
"[t]he rule of reason requires the fact-finder to 'weigh[] all of the 
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should 
be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition,"~37 
and that "[t]he plaintiff may satisfy [its] burden by proving the existence 
of actual anticompetitive effects."238 
In addition, Brown University offered an interesting approach to the 
market power issue, observing that because proof of actual effects is not 
always possible, "courts typically allow proof of the defendant's 'market 
power' instead.""' This appears to present market power as a 
permissive, rather than restrictive, element. That is, it seems to view the 
preferred approach under the rule of reason as that of proving actual 
anticompetitive effect. When that is not possible, the court will "allow" 
proof of market power, which is presumably intended to show when 
there is a potential of anticompetitive effects. In this way, market power 
substitutes for proof of anticompetitive effect, which the court assumes 
cannot be shown. This seems close to the Supreme Court's treatment of 
market power in its per se cases240 and to Philadelphia National Bank's 
presumption of anticompetitive effect from market share.241 It is an 
approach almost opposite that of a threshold market power requirement. 
V. THE THEORETICAL VALIDITY OF THE MARKET 
POWER REQUIREMENT 
This Article's purpose is not to argue that a market power requirement 
is inappropriate; such a requirement might indeed be appropriate, at least 
in some cases. The purpose instead is simply to point out that the case 
for the requirement has not been made. The previous sections showed 
234. Id. at 143. 
235. See, e.g., Fineman v. Annstrong World Indus. Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 202 (3d Cir. 
1992) (observing that Indiana Federation of Dentists said that market power need not be 
shown where there is "a naked restriction on price or output without a competitive 
justification" or where the plaintiff provides "'proof of actual detrimental effects"') 
(quoting Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at460-61). 
236. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
237. Id. at 668 (second alteration in original) (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)). 
238. Id. (citing Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61; Tunis Bros. Co. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 728 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
239. Id. (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984); Tunis Bros., 
952 F.2d at 727). 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28. 
241. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
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that the Supreme Court has never adopted a market power requirement 
and that the lower courts have done so on shaky foundations. This 
section offers a brief discussion of the theoretical justifications that have 
been offered for the market power requirement. 
The justification most commonly offered for a market power 
requirement is that a seller without market power cannot impose 
anticompetitive terms.242 This falls far short of justifying a requirement 
that a plaintiff prove market power. The question is not whether the 
defendant must have market power, but whether it makes antitrust 
litigation more accurate and efficient to require that the plaintiff prove 
that the defendant has market power. Given the difficulties of proving 
market power and even of defining a market,"' it is not clear that the 
interests of litigation are best served by requiring a showing of market 
power. It might well be more accurate and efficient to allow plaintiffs to 
show anticompetitive effect directly. 
To make the case for a market power requirement, it must be shown 
that proof of market power is more accurate or efficient than proof of 
anticompetitive effect. Judge Easterbrook has made the most prominent, 
and perhaps the o~, effort in this direction. In his 1984 article The 
Limits of Antitrust, then-Professor Easterbrook advocated the use of a 
series of "filters," most prominent among them market power,"' in 
antitrust cases.246 He argued that it is difficult for judges to decide the 
ultimate antitrust question-whether a business practice is 
procompetitive or anticompetitive-so that filters are desirable in order 
to screen out weak antitrust claims.247 Rather startlingly, Easterbrook 
says that the issue of competitive effect is difficult to decide because 
antitrust defendants are unable to explain why their actions are 
procompetitive: "[E]ntrepreneurs often flounder from one practice to 
another trying to find one that works. When they do, they may not know 
why it works, whether because of efficiency or exclusion.""' 
242. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
243. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4. 
244. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 2, at I. 
245. Market power is most prominent in the article, where it is the first of five 
filters Easterbrook describes. See id. at 19-23. 
246. See id. at 17-39. 
247. Others have challenged this claim, arguing that the factual inquiry in antitrust 
cases is not inherently more difficult than those in other complex cases. See Richard S. 
Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 
Tux. L. REV. 41, 69 (1984). 
248. Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME 
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Easterbrook' s view that businesspeople may not understand or be able 
to explain their actions is not supported by the business literature. 
Businesspeople pay a lot of money to business schools and consultants 
in order to be told what to do, and why it will work. That does not 
establish, of course, that any individual businessperson knows whether 
his or her business practices are efficient or exclusionary. But given the 
broad dissemination of business strategy information, it does mean that 
it is unwise to casually assert that businesspeople routinely are 
"floundering." 
In any event, the real question is whether Easterbrook's filters-and 
more particularly the market power filter, which has been widely 
adopted by courts-do a good job of distinguishing practices that are 
likely to be anticompetitive from those that are likely to be 
procompetitive. Or, to put the question in the form in which courts 
adopting a market power requirement typically put it, is the existence vel 
non of market power a good means of determining whether a particular 
practice can be anticompetitive? Even if individual businesspeople 
might not be able to answer this question, business consultants probably 
can. After all, business professors and consultants, unlike judges,249 are 
presumably selected for their ability to evaluate the likely success of 
business practices. 
To examine how business professionals view the significance of 
market power, the paragraphs below discuss two works of Michael 
Porter. 250 Porter is a logical choice, because he is perhaps the most 
prominent writer on business practices, and is also one whose advice has 
been recognized as relevant to antitrust issues.251 Porter describes five 
L. REV. 972. 975 (1986). This Article's research uncovered only one article in which 
this claim is addressed. See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Predation, 
"Rationality." and Judicial Somnambulance, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 811 (1996). Professors 
Adams and Brock point out that the claim is inconsistent with Easterbrook's contentions 
elsewhere that potential victims of predatory-pricing strategies have sophisticated 
responses for defeating those strategies. See id. at 860 n.238 ( citing Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 269-
71 ( 1981) ). Adams and Brock do not, however, discuss the importance of the claim for 
Easterbrook's "filtering" approach more generally. 
249. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 305, 306 (1987) ("After all, judges are not selected for business acumen and are not 
penalized for bad decisions."). 
250. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND 
SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE (1985) [hereinafter PORTER, ADVANTAGE]; 
MICHAELE. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES 
AND COMPETITORS (1980) [hereinafter PORTER, STRATEGY]. 
251. See Innovation, Rivalry, and Competitive Advantage: Interview with Professor 
Michael E. Porter, ANTITRUST, Spring 1991, at 5, 5 ("Professor Michael Porter has been 
a leading scholar and author concerning business strategy for years.") (Editor's Note) 
[hereinafter Innovation and Rivalry]; Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech 
Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 
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forces that "determine[] the ultimate profit potential in [an] industry""': 
rivalry among existing firms, the threat of new entrants, the threat of 
substitute products or services, the bargaining power of buyers, and the 
bargaining power of suppliers."' This section focuses on the first two of 
these. 
In Porter's view, rivalry is the central component of competition.254 
The importance of rivalry in antitrust is also recognized by Chicago 
School antitrust scholars, if only implicitly."' For example, Easterbrook 
relies on rivalry in the following passage justifying the use of a market 
power screen: 
Firms that lack power cannot injure competition no matter how hatd they try. 
They may injure a few consumers, or a few rivals, or themselves ... by 
selecting "anticompetitive" tactics. When the firms lack matket power, though, 
they cannot persist in deleterious practices. Rival firms will offer the 
consumers better deals.256 
Thus, Easterbrook's view is that rivalry always steps in to eliminate 
inefficient practices. 
Porter's view is different. Rivalry is important in Porter's analysis 
because it describes the vigor with which competitors try to take away 
each other's business. In Porter's view, "good" competitors play by the 
"rules of [the game],""' allowing all to profit."' Under these 
circumstances, competitors do not need market power in order to impose 
supracompetitive terms."' That is, whereas Easterbrook assumes-as 
does Posner-that when a seller without market power imposes 
anticompetitive terms on its customers, the seller's competitors will 
1195 n.149 (1996) (describing Porter as "[t]he most prominent business strategist"). 
252. PORTER, STRATEGY, supra note 250, at 3. 
253. See id. at 3-6. 
254. See id. at 4-6. 
255. Some such scholats make statements that could be interpreted to mean that 
rivalry is not important. For exatnple, Easterbrook has said that "[a] 'competitive 
matket' is not necessarily the one with the most rivalry moment-to-moment." 
Easterbrook, supra note 2, at I; see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A 
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 58 (1978) ("[The] identification of competition with rivalry 
will not do for antitrust purposes. It makes rivalry an end in and of itself, no matter how 
many or how latge the benefits flowing from the elimination of rivalry."). It is surely 
correct that some level of cooperation among competitors will often provide efficiencies, 
but it is not this sort of elimination of rivalry that Porter has in mind. 
256. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 20. 
257. PORTER, ADVANTAGE, supra note 250, at 213. 
258. See id. at 212-18. 
259. Alternatively, one could view the sort of implicit cooperation required lo 
eliminate rivalry as a source of matket power. 
41 
offer the customers better deals, Porter believes that the competitors may 
instead choose to go along, allowing all of them to profit. 
Possible instances of such parallel anticompetitive behavior in 
antitrust are not difficult to find. Easterbrook, in fact, chooses one as an 
example of how the courts go wrong. In Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States (Standard Stations), 260 the government challenged the exclusive 
dealing arrangements that Standard Oil had with its dealers. Standard 
Oil had only a sixteen percent share of the market,261 and therefore did 
not have market power. For that reason, Easterbrook lists Standard 
Stations as a case that "is easy to knock out ... at the threshold."262 But 
the Court observed that Standard Oil's competitors also used similar 
exclusive dealing arrangements.263 Easterbrook would argue that this 
parallel behavior indicates that the practice was efficient, else one or 
more of the competitors would deviate from it and profit. From Porter's 
expert business perspective, though, it might instead be the case that all 
of the oil companies were "good" competitors playing by the "rules of 
[ the game]. "264 That is, perhaps all of the oil companies do better if they 
all resist any efforts of gasoline dealers to play one oil company off 
against another. 
There are other variations on the rivalry question. For instance, the 
market might not be one like that in Standard Stations, with a number of 
sellers of roughly equal size, but might instead have one dominant firm 
and a number of smaller competitors. In this context, Porter discusses 
the effect of "good" market leaders. A "good" leader "with high return-
on-investment goals, concern for the 'health of the industry,' a strategy 
built upon differentiation, and a disinclination to serve certain industry 
segments due to mixed motives will offer opportunities for followers to 
earn attractive returns in a relatively stable industry environment."265 
That is, even small competitors in industries dominated by a "good" 
market leader can-at least if they are in segments that the leader is 
disinclined to serve --earn supracompetitive returns. 
The point here, of course, is not that vigorous rivalry does not exist. 
The point is that there is no way to evaluate the significance of market 
power without knowing about the conditions of rivalry in the industry. 
If rivalry is absent or weak, a small market share may not prevent a 
seller from imposing anticompetitive terms. And even where rivalry 
appears to exist, as when sellers compete with each other using different 
260. 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
26 I. See id. at 295-96. 
262. Easterbrook. supra note 2, at 23. 
263. See Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 295, 309. 
264. PORTER, ADVANTAGE, supra note 250, at 213. 
265. Id. at 216. 
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sales practices, appearances may be misleading: a recent article showed 
that two sellers can each earn supracompetitive profits if one imposes 
tying arrangements with its sales and the other does not.266 Thus, a 
single-minded focus on market power can be unhelpful and perhaps 
misleading. 
Another perspective from which to look at the business expert's view 
of market power is from the view of an individual seller seeking to gain 
a competitive advantage.267 As Andrew Rosenfield268 pointed out in a 
presentation at the 1998 American Bar Association Section of Antitrust 
Law's Spring Meeting, Porter encourages sellers following his advice to 
behave anticompetitively. He does so in his discussion of "defensive 
strategy ,"269 which includes "raisin~ barriers to entry and mobility to 
make a challen~e more difficult."" Barriers to entry are a source of 
market power," so a seller that creates such barriers, at least if they 
provide no competitive benefits, has behaved anticompetitively. 
Moreover, the sorts of activities that Porter advocates in this area are 
exactly the sorts of vertical restraints that are often challenged under the 
rule of reason: exclusive agreements with dealers and suppliers,"' 
bundling (ting),273 and various sorts of product differentiation, such as 
advertising 74 and sales assistance to dealers."' 
Porter does not encourage his readers to engage in defensive tactics 
indiscriminately, or, as Easterbrook would have it, "randomly." Instead, 
he "show[s] how a firm can identify the most effective defensive tactics 
in a particular industry."216 A view of competition focused on market 
power would suggest that only sellers with power could engage in 
defensive tactics. This is not Porter's view. He says that "[t]he 
effectiveness of a defensive tactic is a function of the asymmetry 
266. See Yongmin Chen, Equilibrium Product Bundling, 70 J. Bus. 85, 86 (1997). 
267. An approach along this line of reasoning is advocated for vertical intrabrand 
restraints in Gerhart, supra note 35, at 442-43. 
268. Rosenfield was then the president of Lexecon, Inc., the law-and-economics 
consulting firm. 
269. PORlER, ADVANTAGE, supra note 250, at 482; see id. at 482-512. 
270. Id. at 483. 
271. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 39 ("For antitrust purposes, a barrier to entry 
is some factor in a market that permits firms already in the market to earn monopoly 
profits, while deterring outsiders from coming in."). 
272. See PORlER, ADVANTAGE, supra note 250, at 489-90, 493. 
273. See id. at 425-36. 
274. See id. at 500. 
275. See id. at 123-24. 
276. Id. at 483. 
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between the cost of the tactic to the firm and the cost imposed on the 
challenger."211 Sometimes, it is true, a defensive tactic will be less 
costly to a firm with more market power; Porter gives the example of 
advertising, which is usually relatively less costly to a firm with a larger 
market share."' But other practices, such as encouraging or subsidizing 
dealers' investments in facilities,279 may actually be less expensive for 
sellers with smaller market shares."0 
To be sure, Porter also emphasizes that sellers "should select those 
defensive tactics which are valuable to buyers,""' and presumably it is 
exactly those practices that are valuable to buyers that would not require 
market power to impose. But Porter also makes clear that the value to 
the seller of a defensive tactic cannot be measured only by whether the 
practice will pay for itself through increased sales, which a practice 
valuable to buyers presumably would do. He says that the value of the 
practice must also be measured by whether it forces other sellers to 
spend more.282 Thus, one could imagine that a seller might give its 
dealers exclusive territories and subsidize their investments in facilities 
in order to impose higher costs on other sellers with more dealers."' 
Once again, the point of this discussion is not to argue that market 
power is irrelevant. Market power, at least in the form of cost 
advantages, is relevant even in Porter's analysis. But the analysis must 
be a much more careful one than the simple calculation of market share 
that is now typical. Instead, it requires an examination of the particular 
practice that is challenged and a determination of whether that practice is 
less expensive (or at least no more expensive) to the defendant than to 
the plaintiff that challenges it. 284 If so, the plaintiffs claim may be 
277. Id. at 500-01. 
278. See id. at 501. 
279. See id. at 125. As Porter says, these sorts of practices function in part as 
"signals," the factors used by buyers to evaluate a firm's offerings. Id. at 139. Such 
factors include "advertising, reputation, packaging, the professionalism, appearance, and 
personality of supplier employees, the attractiveness of facilities, and information 
provided in sales presentations." Id. Signaling is particularly important because, as 
Porter points out, "signaling does not itself create value." Id. at 156. Therefore, 
signaling produces no compensating procompetitive effect to balance its possibly 
anticompetitive differentiating effect. 
280. Imagine, for example, that there are two sellers, one with few dealers and one 
with many. If the seller with few dealers subsidized those dealers' investments in fancy 
new facilities, the seller with many dealers could find it more expensive to respond in 
kind. 
281. PORTER, ADVANTAGE, supra note 250, at 500. 
282. See id. at 425, 501. 
283. See supra note 280. 
284. That is, it requires an analysis of whether the defendant is raising its rivals' 
costs. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 230-48 (1986); 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 
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plausible even if the defendant does not possess traditional market 
power. And if the claim is plausible, any anticompetitive effects of the 
practice must be balanced with any procompetitive effects, as Porter's 
analysis suggests"' and the Supreme Court mandates.286 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The requirement that an antitrust plaintiff show market power in rule 
of reason cases has an uninspiring history and unconvincing 
justifications. Such a requirement has never been adopted by the 
Supreme Court, and is currently imposed by only the Seventh and 
Fourth Circuits. Indeed, the requirement was never imposed very 
widely, despite frequent claims to the contrary. More significantly, the 
Seventh Circuit cases that initially established the requirement, and that 
continue to be cited for it, did so with misleading citations to cases from 
other circuits. Furthermore, the justifications that have been offered for 
the requirement have generally been either theoretically valid but 
unconnected to litigation, or empirically based but both implausible and 
d 287 unsupporte . 
Still, the imposition of a market power requirement responds to valid 
concerns about antitrust litigation. Weak cases are brought, and it 
would be desirable to dismiss them at an early stage, without the 
expense of a full-blown rule of reason analysis. In this respect, the 
market power approach's theoretical justification-that cases in which a 
defendant cannot injure competition should be dismissed-may have a 
role to play. But that role must take into account the variety of contexts 
in which the rule of reason is applied; it does not mandate the 
indiscriminate application of a single market power test. 288 
76 GEO. L.J. 241, 258 (1987). 
285. See supra text accompanying note 281. 
286. See supra note 19. 
287. See supra Part V. Interestingly, some have suggested that the use of market 
power as a screen is even less valid in the high technology industries that are the subject 
of much of today's antitrust litigation. See Maija Pesola, Are High-Tech Industries 
Really Different?, GLOBAL COMP. REV., Apr.-May 1999, at 14, 15 (reporting the views 
of private and government antitrust lawyers that market definition and market share 
measures are less useful in high technology industries). 
288. In this respect, it is worth noting Professor Hovenkamp's observation that in 
some circumstances, notably "foreclosure" offenses, "[t]he real 'power' basis of the 
offense ... is market share, not market power as such." HovENKAMP, supra note 1, at 
82. One might think, because market share is so often used as a proxy for market power, 
that this is an unimportant distinction. But the share that is relevant in foreclosure cases 
45 
Some efforts have been made in the direction of a more context-
sensitive approach, but one that would still allow the dismissal of weak 
antitrust cases. For example, shortly after the Supreme Court's decision 
in Sylvania, several commentators proposed approaches that recognized 
the "sharp differences in competitive effect among the different 
'justifications' for vertical restrictions."289 These articles, however, 
appear to have been swept away by the Valley Liquors I and II-led focus 
on market power, and more recent efforts along the same line290 seem to 
have had little effect."' Perhaps recognition of the deficiencies in the 
development of the market power requirement will serve to encourage a 
more discriminating approach to the rule of reason. 
is the share of the market foreclosed, not the market share of the defendant. Therefore, a 
focus on market power is misdirected. 
289. Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical 
Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 26 (1978); see id. at 26-37; see also Gerhart, supra 
note 35, at 442. 
290. See generally Warren S, Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand 
Quality: Vertical Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 815 (1992); Robert L. 
Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When Are Vertical 
Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTI1RUST L.J. 407 (1996). 
291. In the European Union, some effort has been made to distinguish formally 
among the various sorts of vertical restraints with a proposal to use a dual-market power-
threshold that "allows an economically justified gradation in the treatment of vertical 
restraints reflecting differences in their likely anti-competitive effects." Communication 
from the Commission on the Application of the Community Competition Rules to 
Vertical Restraints (Follow-Up to the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints), 1998 OJ. (C 
365) 3, 19. 
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